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Abstract
This document is a literature review of sustainable growth. Because
there are many definitions of sustainable growth, we use the following
one that is very common in economics. Economic growth is sustain-
able, if it meets the needs of the present generations without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. This
concerns both the availability of resources for future generations and
the environmental impacts of current decisions on future activities.
Section I, we consider issues and policy measures related to the
resource problem. We introduce dynamic models in which exhaustible
resources are used in production and apply them to several cases: an
open economy, a backstop technology and the relationship of climate
and economic growth. We also examine a transition of dirty to clean
technology and the consequences of this to public finance and inter-
generational equity.
In Section II, we consider macroeconomic performance with nat-
ural resources: origins and effects of resource abundance, patterns
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of development for world prices, resource depletion, peak production,
“Dutch disease” and external debt. If economic growth affects en-
vironment, then the abatement of environmental damages must be
included into the discussion of sustainable economic growth.
In Section III, we present resource extraction and the environmen-
tal impacts of economic activities in the context of multiple decision
makers. This introduces strategic interactions of agents, e.g. firms,
households and nations. We consider collusion as well as Cournot,
Bertrand games and discuss on diverse micro and macro policies that
consider incentive compatibility.
In the Appendix, we introduce a finite horizon procedure called
Nonlinear Model Predictive Control (NMPC) by which the models
presented in this survey can be numerically solved.
Journal of Economic Literature: C61, O11, Q30, Q32, C73, D58, D83
Keywords: Non-renewable resources, environment, sustainable growth,
dynamic decision theory, multiple agent’s decisions, strategic depen-
dence, environmental games
Introduction
There is a large body of literature on sustainable development and eco-
nomic growth with an emphasis on economies with abundant natural re-
sources. This paper extensively reviews the modeling of sustainable growth
with exhaustible resources, where exhaustible resource is used as an input
for production activities. Within this context, a basic model of a dynamic
decision problem with two dynamic constraints – changes in capital accumu-
lation, and constraints imposed by the finiteness of the resource stock – is
presented. This modeling approach is based on literature by Dasgupta and
Heal (1974), Stiglitz (1974) and Solow (1973). As Dasgupta and Heal (1974)
recognize, an economy’s growth potential is constrained by resources, which
have a limited long-run supply, and technological feasabilities.1
The basic model of a closed economy can be augmented to an open econ-
omy model by adding a constraint of changes in foreign debt accumulation.
Blanchard (1983) sketches the open economy model for the country with
large external debt based on work by Bardhan (1966) and Bruno (1967) and
in more recent research by Obstfeld (1980, 1982), Svensson and Razin (1983),
Sachs (1981, 1982). Blanchard and Fischer (1989) present a closed economic
model with dynamic budget constraint; they also extend their model to an
open economy by taking current account deficits, which can be financed with
external debt, into account. They also show a relationship between the cur-
rent account, savings, and investment. This paper discusses two ways of
intertemporal budget constraints’ formulations presented by Sachs (1982).
Mansoorian (1991) examines the long-run problem of resource discovery
and models heavy borrowing of resource-abundant economies in an optimiz-
ing framework. In his paper, a Dutch disease model2 with three sectors:
non-traded goods, manufacturing and resources3 using the overlapping gen-
eration framework of Blanchard (1985), is presented. Eastwood and Venables
(1982) analysis of a macroeconomic response of a country to the discovery of
a large natural resource in the United Kingdom is also discussed. Hamilton
1A more extensive survey of the basic approaches is given in Greiner et al. ( 2008)
2This paper reviews definitions of the Dutch disease and standard models presented by
Corden (1984) and Neary and Van Wijinbergen (1986).
3Non-traded and manufacturing goods are consumable and the resource sector’s output
is exported.
3
(2001) studies the nature of the development path in resource-rich countries
and presents theory and measurement for genuine saving in countries con-
cerned with sustainable development.
If we assume that a resource is available in unlimited quantities, but at
different grades and costs, then the model can be augmented by introducing
a backstop technology,4 as suggested by Heal (1993). Moreover, variations of
the model can stress the climate change problem by including the additional
dynamic constraints of carbon dioxide emissions and global temperature.
Recent growth models such as Acemoglu et al. (2012) stress the distinction
between “clean” and “dirty”5 inputs for the production and use “endoge-
nous and directed technical change.” Acemoglu et al. (2012, p. 131) point
out that “when inputs are sufficiently substitutable, sustainable growth can
be achieved with temporary taxes/subsidies that redirect innovation toward
clean inputs.” In addition, the extension of the model can include public
capital6 and sovereign debt dynamics.7
In regard to contributors to wealth, comprehensive measurement of wel-
fare that captures reproducible capital, human capital, natural capital, health
capital and technological change along the line Arrow et al. (2012) will be
discussed. This paper also studies the literature related to problem of inter-
generational equity and compares different criteria to deal with this problem.
Commonly used discounted utility and welfare criteria will be compared to
alternative approaches, including the Rawlsian criterion, the Chichilnisky’s
criterion of satisfaction of basic needs, as well as the Ramsey (1928), Von
Weizsa¨cker (1967) and Heal (1985) criteria.
We review the surveys on origins and causation of natural resource abun-
dance. In this context, widely used the literature, such as Sachs and Warner
(1995, 1999, 2001), on the negative relationship between the natural resource
abundance and economic growth is examined with its critiques and proposed
4According to Heal (1976), through backstop technology, such as resource extraction
from marine sources, the resource can be “inexhaustible but available at various grades
and at various costs.”
5Production with dirty input uses non-renewable resource (Acemoglu et al., 2012).
6In Semmler et al. (2007, p. 4), public capital is represented by “public infrastructure
to support market production as well as facilities for health and education services.”
7Blanchard and Fischer (1989) present dynamic budget constraint, and Greiner et
al. (2007) use the evolution of public debt accumulation with breakdown of return to
government bond, public consumption, transfers, public investment, and tax revenues.
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measurement and econometric problems. Out review of studies on scarcity of
mineral resource start with Hotelling (1931) and Barnett and Morse (1963).
The basic Hotelling rule for perfectly competitive market indicates that a dif-
ference between market price and marginal cost should increase at interest
rate. Modifications of the Hotelling basic model take into account extraction
costs and consider a monopolistic owner of the resources. Barnett and Morse
(1963) presented the first comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis
of impact of resource scarcity on growth. Their empirical test results show a
decreasing scarcity for mineral resources.
Empirically one finds for non-renewable resources that prices tend to rise
as their scarcity increases. Early studies such as Hotelling’s (1931) suggest
an increasing trend in prices. Greiner et al. (2012b) suggest a numerical
solution, using dynamic programming with infinite decision horizon, that
indicates monotonically rising prices and monotonically declining extraction
rates if the initially known 8 stock is large. However, in the case of small
initial stock, the extraction rate will rise −− if there is a further discovery
of resources −− but will later decline. Then, the optimal extraction rate
may have an inverted-U shape and the price can show a U-shaped path.
Similar results have been shown by Pindyck (1978). Solutions of the optimal
exploration and production of an exhaustible resource, by Pindyck (1978), in
both competitive and monopolistic markets, also indicate a U-shaped price
evolution if the initial stock of the reserve is small.
This paper not only examines literature on mineral resource exports and
economic growth but also on macroeconomic performance and economic
problems of the resource-rich country including resource depletion, volatility
of resource price, Dutch disease, and the threads that may arise from ex-
tensive external debt. External debt problems are discussed by comparing
countries that borrowed heavily after the resource discovery that led to a
resource boom. During the period of high commodity prices in the 1970s,
countries that discovered large deposits of resources used their resources as
collateral for debt. However, when the prices declined in 1980s, these coun-
tries experienced a debt crisis because they had extensive erxternal liabilities
and were unable to continue borrowing for economic activitities from abroad.
8Greiner et al. (2012b) refer to discovered reserves as “known” resource.
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Overall, since resource scarcity gives rise to extraction cost, and spot and
future prices of resoruces, exhaustible resource prices tend to rise as scarcity
increases. Thus early studies such as Hotelling (1931) and Solow (1974)
suggest an increasing trend for resource prices. However, some of the later
studies, e.g., Barnett and Morse (1963), did not show a rising trend in mineral
prices over time. More recenty, a number of studies, e.g., Slade (1982),
Pindyck (1978), Livernois and Uhler (1987), Swierzbinski and Mendelshohn
(1989), Greiner et al. (2012b), and Nyambuu and Semmler (2013), suggest
a U-shaped mineral price trend.
The paper presents decision making and policy options as well and stud-
ies environmental or carbon tax in a more complicated setting, where there
is a strategic dependence between the decisions of agents. In this context,
decision making is mostly studied in some game theoretical set ups. Yet,
in strategic decision making, complicated issues arise concerning incentive
compatible decision and policy options on both micro and macro levels. Ex-
amples of strategic dependence are worked out first with static games on
the firm level with respect to oligopolistic competition. Furthermore, models
with growth and diverse set ups for strategic decision making and further
policy options are discussed. In this context, topics such as dirty investment,
Pigouvian taxation, lobbying, and agents’ interdependence in the economy
are considered.
For the numerical solutions to the dynamics, the method of nonlinear
model predictive control (NMPC) is used that operates with a finite time
horizon procedure. NMPC is a discrete-time model and is used as an ap-
proximation of infinite-horizon optimal control problem (Gru¨ne and Pannek,
2011). In the case of a very long time horizon, NMPC approximates the
infinite time horizon model well, and even with a small number of periods,
important issues in a model can still be investigated.9 NMPC only computes
single (approximate) optimal trajectories rather than computing the optimal
value function for all possible initial states. As summarized in Gru¨ne et al.
(2013), this method can be used in dynamic decision problems in economics.
The remainder is divided into three main parts including the basic mod-
eling and model variants, macroeconomic performance, and numerical solu-
9See Greiner et al. (2012a, p. 5).
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tion. Part I focuses on theoretical aspects of modeling growth with natural
resources. It begins with the definitions of sustainable development followed
by problem of intergenerational equity, and measurement of wealth. The ba-
sic model and its extensions, including backstop technology, open economy,
climate change constraints and other variations are presented. In Part II,
a study of the relationship between growth and natural resource abundance
is followed by the literature on resource depletion and price trends of the
resources. The following sections discuss the problem of Dutch disease and
the accumulation of external debt. In Part III we introduce multiple agent’s
decision making with strategic dependence between different agents, framed
in terms of a game theoretical set up. Here then diverse micro and macro
policies are considered that are incentive compatible. The appendix sketches
a numerical solution technique called NMPC.
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1 Basic models and issues
1.1 Notion of sustainable development
There exist different definitions of sustainable development. A commonly
accepted point is that economic activity is unsustainable if the relevant bi-
ological or social system is degraded. In general, long-run development and
consumption is affected by resource and environmental constraints. Pezzey
(1989, p. 14) shows the difference between sustainable growth and sustain-
able development where “non-declining output or consumption over time”
represents sustainable economic growth and “non-declining utility over time”
can be used for sustainable economic development. Pearce et al. (1990, p.
4) note that “natural capital stock should not decrease over time.”10
Similarly, the Brundtland report of The World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development (WCED, 1987, p. 52) states that “If needs are to be
met on a sustainable basis the Earth’s natural resource base must be con-
served and enhanced.” Repetto (1986, p. 15) also highlights conservation
of natural capital: “Sustainable development, as a goal rejects policies and
practices that support current living standards by depleting the productive
base, including natural resources, and that leaves future generations with
poorer prospects and greater risks than our own.”
Policy makers are concerned with equity between generations or so-called
intergenerational equity in the achievement of sustainable development.
Pezzey (1992) presents different definitions of the sustainable development
concepts. According to the sustainability criterion presented by Tietenberg
(1984, p. 30), “future generations should be left no worse off than current
generations.” Pearce (1987, p. 13) points out that for sustainability we must
ensure that “the conditions necessary for equal access to the resource base
be met for each generation.” Solow (1991, p. 181) examines definitions on
sustainability proposed by UNESCO, U.N. Environment Programs and the
World Conservation Union, and suggests “an obligation to conduct ourselves
so that we leave to the future the option or the capacity to be as well off as
we are” as an indicator of sustainability.
10See Pearce et al. (1990, p. 1).
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Brundtland report emphasizes the problem of a society that might “com-
promise its ability to meet the essential needs of its people in the future –
by overexploiting resources” (WCED, 1987, p. 42). Use of non-renewable re-
sources reduces the stock of the resources available for future generations. As
the Commission suggests, for the achievement of sustainable development,
“the rate of depletion of non renewable resources should foreclose as few
future options as possible” (WCED, 1987, p. 43).
1.2 Intergenerational equity
A fair treatment of different generations can be formulated through a num-
ber of approaches proposed in the literature. Intergenerational equity can be
accounted for simply by assigning the same weight to the present and future
generations, in other words by taking a zero utility discount rate. Alterna-
tively, discounted utility and welfare criteria can be used for the selection
of the development paths. These criteria include the Rawlsian criterion and
the Chichilnisky’s criterion of satisfaction of basic needs, Ramsey (1928), Von
Weizsa¨cker (1967) and Heal (1985).
Weizsa¨cker (1967) proposed an overtaking criterion that compares two
consumption paths C1t and C
s
t and corresponding utilities. Greiner and
Semmler (2008, p. 150) express this as follows:
T∫
0
U
(
C1t
)
dt ≥
T∫
0
U
(
C2t
)
dt.
However, the zero discount rate and overtaking criterion, however, have
analytical and technical drawbacks compared to the discounted utility crite-
rion. Greiner and Semmler (2008, p. 150) point out that “for a zero discount
rate the set of attainable values of the integral may be open, and the way of
ranking consumption paths according to the overtaking criterion is incom-
plete.” Similarly, Chichilnisky (1995, p. 236) argues that the “overtaking
criterion fails to rank any two paths which switch between overtaking and
being overtaken by others” which makes the criterion “seriously incomplete
or indecisive ranking of alternative paths.”
Rawls (1972) presented the Rawlsian criterion that is concerned with
the welfare of the less advantaged generation, and as Greiner and Semmler
9
(2008, p. 150) note it requires that the “welfare level to be the same for
all generations.” Greiner and Semmler (2008, p. 150) show the Rawlsian
criterion as follows:
maxfeasiblepathsmingenerationst (Welfaret) .
Greiner and Semmler (2008) draw upon Solow’s (1974) statement that the
non-renewable resource stock will last longer if the discounted utility criterion
is used instead of Rawlsian criterion, and note that “since the utilitarian rule
demands higher savings, earlier generations will have a lower standard of
living than the constant max-min would generate.” Solow (1974, p. 41)
points out that “the max-min criterion seems to be reasonable criterion for
intertemporal planning decisions except for two important difficulties: (a) it
requires an initial capital stock big enough to support a decent standard of
living, else it perpetuates poverty, but it can not tell us why the initial capital
stock should ever have been accumulated; and (b) it seems to give foolishly
conservative injunctions when there is stationary population and unlimited
technical progress.”
Another welfare criterion was proposed by Chichilnisky (1995, p. 231);
she defined two axioms for sustainable development: “the axioms require
that neither the present nor the future should play a dictatorial role.”11
Axiom 1 states that “the present generation should not dictate the outcome
in disregard for the future” and the Axiom 2 states that “the welfare criterion
should not be dictated by the long-run future, and thus requires sensitivity
to the present.” Preferences are sustainable if the welfare criterion satisfies
both axioms (p. 237).
As presented in Greiner and Semmler (2008, p. 151), Chichilnisky’s crite-
rion, where “positive weight is placed on the present and on the very long-run
properties of a growth path,” can be expressed in following way:
α
∞∫
0
U (Ct, St)△ (t)dt+ (1− α) lim
t→∞
U (Ct, St) .
where α ∈ (0, 1) and
∫∞
0
△(t)dt = 1. More weight is placed on the future with
the Chichilnisky criterion in comparison to the discounted utility criterion
(Greiner and Semmler 2008, p. 151).
11See Chichilnisky (1995, p. 231).
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Economists are well aware of the difficulty in finding a welfare criterion
that not only permits intergenerational equity, but also operates well tech-
nically. Although discounted utility emphasizes the present over the future,
it is still one of the widely used approaches (Greiner and Semmler 2008).
Chichilnisky (1995, p. 235) pointed out that “no criterion has achieved the
analytical clarity of the discounted sum of utilities.”
1.3 Measurement of wealth
There are different approaches to the measurement of comprehensive wealth.
In his analysis of wealth, Dasgupta (2005) considers not only manufactured
and human capital but also natural capital. While The World Bank (2011)
estimates the shadow values of natural, human and reproducible capitals, a
study by Arrow, et al. (2012) takes into account two more contributors of
wealth, namely health improvements and technological change. In contrast
to studies based on income, Arrow et al. (2012) examine the sustainability of
economic growth by focusing on the measurement of wealth. In their sustain-
ability analysis of intergenerational well-being, sustainability is reached if a
comprehensive wealth measure is maintained. The sustainability criterion is
met if per capita wealth is increasing.
In the paper by Arrow et al. (2012), natural capital includes not only
non-renewable energy and mineral resources but also renewable forest and
land resources. They compare resource trading countries and stress that
while non-renewable resource exporting countries have enjoyed capital gains
on stocks of their resources, importers have experienced capital losses. In
open economies, since higher prices of exhaustible resources bring profit to
exporters, the wealth of an exporter is higher than would be found by using
current prices. Resource owners receive capital gains as a rental value of
a non-renewable resource increases over time. However, real wealth will be
reduced because consumers will have to pay higher real prices (see Arrow et
al., 2012).
Arrow et al. (2012) apply the model to five countries including the United
States, China, Brazil, India and Venezuela. Using data from 1995 to 2000
they examine whether economic development was sustainable. The estima-
tion results indicate the importance of technological change, natural capital,
11
and health capital in achieving sustainability. They point out that the role
of these capitals in sustainable development differs across countries. For ex-
ample, their findings show that in the case of the United Stated and Brazil,
growth in comprehensive wealth is primarily due to investment in repro-
ducible, human and knowledge capital. In all countries except China, the
negative impact of natural capital depletion is outweighed by the changes
in human capital. For China and India, a reduction in natural capital can
be offset by investments in reproducible capital. In Venezuela, a significant
decrease in natural capital leads to the substantial changes in capital stocks.
Sizeable capital gains on oil stocks contributed to a positive investment. The
estimated increase in scarcity rents for Venezuela’s oil accounts for large share
of the growth in comprehensive wealth (for details see Arrow et al., 2012).
1.4 The basic model
Early studies by Forrester (1971), Meadows et al. (1972), and Dasgupta and
Heal (1974) emphasize the possibility of resource constraints on economic
growth. Dasgupta and Heal (1974, p. 4) point out that the resource can be
essential “if output of final consumption goods is nil in the absence of the
resource.” In analyzing the depletion of non-renewable resources, Dasgupta
and Heal (1974), Stiglitz (1974) and Solow (1973) use a growth model where
the mineral resource is one of production inputs.
In the basic theoretical model presented by Dasgupta and Heal (1974), a
welfare function for households, where the inter-temporal utility as function
of consumption is maximized with two constraints including evolution of the
capital stock and non-renewable resource. As in Dasgupta and Heal (1974),
Greiner and Semmler (2008, p. 142) assume that the utility function is
strictly concave, which means it should have the properties of U ′(Ct) < 0,
U”(Ct) > 0.
The model has two state variables – the capital stock, Kt, and the re-
mainder of the non-renewable resource, St – and two decision variables –
the consumption, Ct, and the flow of the exhaustible resource, Rt. Dasgupta
and Heal (1974) assume the production function, F (Kt, Rt), to be increasing,
strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable. Following Dasgupta
and Heal (1974), Greiner and Semmler (2008, pp. 141-143) present the op-
12
timization problem with its solutions followed. Dasgupta and Heal (1974),
Stiglitz (1974), and in Solow (1973) presented the basic growth model with
two inputs of production, F (K,R), e.g., capital stock and non-renewable re-
sources. Dynamic maximization problem with objective function of utility as
function of consumption for households, U(C), has constraints of the capital
stock accumulation, K, and the remainder of the non-renewable resource,
S, which is diminished by the flow of the exhaustible resource, R. With a
discount rate of r and given initial stock of the remainder of the resource S0,
Greiner and Semmler’s (2008, pp. 141-3) model is the following: maximize12
∞∫
0
U(Ct)e
−rtdt (1)
subject to
K˙t = F (Kt, Rt)− Ct, S˙t = −Rt, St = S0 −
t∫
0
Rτdτ.
The current value Hamiltonian with two constraints is
H = U(Ct) + α (F (Kt, Rt)− Ct) + β(−Rt),
where α and β are co-state variables or shadow prices of capital accumulation
and resource constraints respectively. The necessary optimality conditions
are obtained by
U ′(C) = α, (2)
αFR = β,
α˙ = rα− αFK , (3)
β˙ = rβ,
with FR =
∂F (K,R)
∂R
and FK =
∂F (K,R)
∂K
.
Dasgupta and Heal (1974, p. 11) and Greiner and Semmler (2008, pp.
165-6) show the following path of the consumption:
C˙
C
=
FK − r
ε(C)
, where ε(C) = −
CU ′′(C)
U ′(C)
.
12Greiner and Semmler’s (2008) dynamic optimization problem is based on Dasgupta
and Heal (1974). Here, extraction cost is not considered.
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Greiner and Semmler (2008) point out that higher discount rate is as-
sociated with further fall of the rate of consumption over time. Dasgupta
and Heal (1974, p. 11) state that the following condition implies “the equal-
ity of the rates of return on the two assets (the exhaustible resource and
reproducible capital).”
FK =
∂FR
∂t
1
FR
(4)
with a production function of homogenous of degree one, a ratio of two inputs
can be expressed as xt = Kt/Rt with f(xt) = F (Kt/Rt, 1). Following Greiner
and Semmler (2008, p. 166), the capital-resource ratio along the optimal path
can be obtained by substituting FR = f(xt) − xtf
′
(xt) and FK = f
′
(xt) in
Eq. (4):
x˙t
xt
= σ
f(xt)
xt
,
where an elasticity of substitution between two production inputs K and R
are defined by
σ = −
f
′
(xt)
(
f(xt)− xtf
′
(xt)
)
xtf(xt)f”(xt)
∈ [0,∞).
Dasgupta and Heal (1974) stress the importance of the elasticity of sub-
stitution in the properties of an optimal path. They use a CES production
function with constant elasticity of substitution:
F (K,R) = [βK(σ−1)/σ + (1− β)R(σ−1)/σ]σ/(σ−1), where 0 < β < 1.
With the Cobb-Douglas production function, Solow (1973) notes that if
the share of capital exceeds the share of natural resources, sustained per
capita consumption can be a feasible objective. Dasgupta and Heal (1974,
pp. 14-9) analyze different forms of production functions, in particular, the
case when R = 0, with different values of the elasticity of substitution and the
results for each cases as shown below. They indicate whether the resource
is essential to production and finitely or infinitely valuable at the margin.
They show that an exhaustible resource is essential to production only when
σ ≤ 1 (pp. 14-15). If σ ≤ 1, then it holds true that
F (K, 0) = 0, ρ = lt
t→∞
f ′(x) = lt
t→∞
f(x)
x
= 0,
14
lt
t→∞
(f(x)− xf ′(x)) = lt
t→∞
f(x) =∞.
In this case, the non-renewable resource is essential to production and in-
finitely valuable at the margin. The price of the resource relative to fixed
capital is rising and tends to be infinite. Additionally, the asymptotic value
of marginal productivity of capital equals zero. On the other hand, if σ < 1,
then it holds true that
F (K, 0) = 0, ρ = lt
t→∞
f ′(x) = lt
t→∞
f(x)
x
= 0,
lt
t→∞
(f(x)− xf ′(x)) = lt
t→∞
f(x) = (1− β)σ/(σ−1).
The resource is essential but finitely valuable at the margin when the rate
of utilization of the resource is zero. Dasgupta and Heal (1974, p. 16) point
out that this is the most pessimistic case because as total output is bounded,
if σ < 1, then Ct → 0 as t → ∞. Thus, a positive and non-decreasing
consumption is not sustainable.
If ∞ > σ > 1, then it holds true that
F (K, 0) = βσ/(σ−1)K, ρ = lt
t→∞
f ′(x) = lt
t→∞
f(x)
x
= βσ/(σ−1) > 0,
lt
t→∞
(f(x)− xf ′(x)) = lt
t→∞
f(x) =∞.
In this case, the non-renewable resource is not essential to production and
infinitely valuable at the margin when the rate of utilization of the resource
is zero.
Stiglitz (1974) points out that resource limitations to growth can be offset
by economic forces, e.g., technical change, the substitution of capital for
natural resources, and changes in the returns to scale profile. In his study
of optimal growth paths, optimal extraction and optimal saving rates in
the presence of non-renewable resources, Stiglitz examines the feasibility of
sustainable levels of per capita consumption. He points out that sustained
growth in consumption per capita can be feasible in his simple model of
economic growth, with exhaustible resources.
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1.5 Extension of the model
1.5.1 Backstop technology
In the basic model, it is assumed that the mineral resources are exhaustible.
This model can be extended by introducing a backstop technology that was
used by Nordhaus (1973) and Heal (1976). Heal (1976, p. 371) points out
that the resource can be “inexhaustible but available at various grades and
at various costs” and “extracted from marine sources or crustal rocks.” Par-
ticularly, at higher prices, the resource can be available in unlimited supply.
Heal (1976, p. 371) states that “cost is assumed to increase with cumu-
lative extraction up to a point, but then to remain constant as a “backstop”
supply is reached.” As examples, he suggests metals such as aluminum and
manganese. These metals’ ores can be extracted from a current deposit,
which is exhaustible and cheap. But these metals can also be extracted from
the sea or rock formations, with indefinite supplies at much higher prices
(Nordhaus 1974; Heal 1976). Similarly, Nordhaus (1973) discusses the ex-
traction of exhaustible oil using extraction from shale as a backstop.
Following Heal (1976, pp. 373-7), Greiner and Semmler (2008, pp. 146-7)
sketch a formulation of the model with backstop technology where the total
amount of the resource at time t which is zt expressed by
zt =
∫ t
0
Rτdτ.
They state that the backstop technology takes over when the conventional
low-cost deposits are exhausted at date T . When these resources are ex-
hausted it switches to an extraction with higher costs. The extraction cost
increases with cumulative extraction up to the level zT ; then the backstop
technology is available at a constant cost per unit, b. The cost of extracting
a unit of the resource, g(zt), has a following property:
∂g/(∂zt) = g
′
(zt) > 0 for 0 ≤ zt ≤ zT and g(zT ) = b > 0 for zt ≥ zT .
The basic model with backstop technology is solved by applying two
maximization problems successively.13 First, before the current deposits are
13For details, see Greiner and Semmler (2008, pp. 146-7).
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exhausted, total extraction costs are given by g(zt)Rt and the problem is
max
T∫
0
U(Ct)e
−rtdt (5)
subject to
K˙t = F (Kt, Rt)− Ct − g(zt)Rt, S˙t = −Rt, St = S0 −
t∫
0
Rτdτ.
Second, after the backstop technology has taken over, total extraction costs
are given by bRt and the problem is
max
∞∫
T
U(Ct)e
−rtdt (6)
subject to
K˙t = F (Kt, Rt)− Ct − bRt. (7)
The Hamiltonian for the first problem is given by14
H = U(Ct) + α (F (Kt, Rt)− Ct − g(zt)Rt) + β(−Rt),
where α and β are co-state variables or shadow prices of capital accumulation
and resource constraints respectively. The necessary optimality conditions
are obtained by
U ′(Ct) = α, αFR − αg(zt) = β, (8)
α˙ = rα− αFK , (9)
β˙ = rβ + αg
′
(zt)Rt, (10)
with FR =
∂F (K,R)
∂R
and FK =
∂F (K,R)
∂K
.
The consumption rate along an optimal path is the following:
C˙
C
=
FK − r
ε(C)
, where ε(C) = −
CU ′′(C)
U ′(C)
,
FK =
∂FR
∂t
1
FR
+
FKg(zt)
FR
. (11)
14cf. Greiner and Semmler (2008, pp. 167-168).
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Following Greiner and Semmler (2008, p. 168), the capital-resource ratio
along the optimal path can be obtained as shown:
x˙t
xt
= σ
f(xt)
xt
+
f
′
(xt)
xtf ”(xt)
g(zt)
xt
.
Correspondingly, the Hamiltonian and the necessary optimality condi-
tions for the second problem [eqs. (6) and (7)] are given by
H = U(Ct) + q1 (F (Kt, Rt)− Ct − bR)
U ′(Ct) = q1, q1FR = q1b, (12)
q˙1 = rq1 − q1FK (13)
Heal (1976) concludes that initially, the stocks of the resource with lower-
cost are exhausted according to equations (8) and (10). He states that “the
initial conditions are chosen that the difference between prices and extraction
costs . . . declines according to (10) and just reaches zero as the lower-cost
stocks are exhausted”.15 After this point, the economy behaves according to
equations (12) and (13), thus, the “extraction costs of the resource always
equal its price.” Heal (1976) stresses that “the relationship between the price
of a resource and its marginal extraction cost along an optimal path . . .
depends on the nature of the extraction technology”16.
1.5.2 Technical progress
Weitzman (1997, p. 1) defines sustainability as “the annualized equivalent of
the present discounted value of consumption that the economy is capable of
achieving” and emphasizes the connection between sustainability, Green Net
National Product17 (NNP), and technological progress.18 Due to importance
of technological progress in long-term sustainability, the Green NNP requires
a significant upward correction in the presence of the technological progress.
In the following formulation Weitzman (1997) shows how the Solow residual
15This equation refers to the equation in this paper that shows the evolution of co-state
variable of resource constraint which is denoted by qt.
16See Heal (1976, p. 377).
17Green NNP is an adjusted national income, where depreciation of capital and depletion
of natural resources at current market prices are deducted from GNP (Weitzman,1997).
18In Weitzman (1997) technological progress is measured as Solow residual.
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connects the sustainability and the Green NNP. Weitzman (1997, p. 5)
presents an optimal control problem that maximizes present discounted value
of consumption, C, where r denotes real interest rate, K is capital stock that
includes natural resource, S represents the production possibilities, P stands
for the price of
∞∫
0
Cte
−rtdt (14)
subject to
(Ct, K˙t) ∈ S(Kt; t), K(0) = K0.
The sustainability, Γt, and the Green NNP function in Weitzman (1997,
p. 7), Y ∗t , are defined as follows:
Γt = r
∞∫
t
C∗(s)e−r(s−t)ds, Y ∗t = C
∗
t + PtK˙
∗
t = G(K
∗
t , Pt; t).
Growth rates of aggregate output, g, and the residual, λ, are:
g ≡
Y˙ ∗
Y ∗
, λ =
1
Y ∗
∂Y ∗
∂t
.
Weitzman (1997, p. 8) derives the technological progress premium:
Θ =
λ
r − g
.
The connection of the current Green NNP and future sustainability is 19
Ψ0 = Y
∗
0 (1 + Θ).
Weitzman (1997, p. 12) argues that “NNP, whether conventionally measured
or green-inclusive, likely understates an economy’s sustainability.”
1.5.3 Open economy
Closed economy optimization models can be modified to represent an open
economy problem. An open economy model with debt and current account is
seen in recent research by Obstfeld (1980, 1982), Svensson and Razin (1983),
19See Weitzman (1997, p. 8)
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Sachs (1981, 1982), Blanchard (1983), Cohen and Sachs (1986), and Barro
et al. (1995).
As Semmler and Sieveking (2000) note, with the assumption of free ac-
cess to capital markets, the country’s debt can be increased by an amount
equivalent to the current account deficits. Sachs (1982) stresses the impor-
tance of the current account in macroeconomic adjustments and shows how
to determine it. He presents two formulations for the intertemporal budget
constraint. Current account (CA) equals financial claims on the rest of the
world, which is denoted by B and can be expressed in the following way:20
B = CA = Q+ r∗B − C −G,
where Q stands for the gross domestic product, Q+r∗B is the gross national
product, C is household consumption, G is government fiscal expenditure,
r∗ is short-term financial assets’ fixed real yield. A positive B implies that
the country is a creditor, and a negative B suggests a debtor.
The following condition, as in Sachs (1982, p. 148) is added to avoid
Ponzi games:
lim
t→∞
e−r
∗tB = 0.
Sachs (1982, p. 149) points out that the initial net indebtedness is balanced
by the discounted value of trade surplus, thus this relationship is shown as
the second formulation of the intertemporal budget constraint:
∞∫
0
e−r
∗t (Q−G− C) dt = −B(0).
Sachs (1982) states that the simple model does not include investment of
physical capital, which plays important role in cross-country current account
behavior.
Sachs, Cooper, and Fischer (1981) examine how an increase in investment
leads to a current account deficit and raises the real exchange rate. His
empirical evidence shows the importance that investment demand had in the
behavior of current accounts and exchange rates in the 1970s.
In an open economy model, Blanchard and Fischer (1989) show that tem-
porary imbalances of saving and investment, which are the current account
20See Sachs (1982, p. 148).
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deficits, can be financed by external debt. With a constant world interest
rate, θ, for foreign borrowing or lending, the change in the foreign debt of an
open economy in per capita term is shown to be:21
dbt
dt
= ct + it
[
1 + T
(
it
kt
)]
+ θbt − f(kt),
where bt stands for per capita debt, ct and it are per capita consumption
and investment spending, and f(kt) is the production function. In addition,
there is a “cost of installing investment goods,” in the transformation of
goods into capital T (·) amount per unit of investment is used (see Blanchard
and Fischer, 1989, p. 59).
From the above budget constraint, foreign debt dynamics are determined
by the difference between spending and output. Blanchard and Fischer (1989,
59-60) state that “the change in foreign debt is the current account deficit
. . . the current account deficit is equal to the excess of absorption over
production.”
Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 60) show that using national income
accounting, the current account deficits can be equal to the difference between
interest payment and net exports of goods:
db/dt = θb− nx,
where nx stands the trade surplus. They show that the current account
deficit is equal to the difference between investment, i(1+T (·)), and savings,
s.22
db/dt = i (1 + T (·))− s.
Similarly, a simple model presented by Blanchard (1983, p. 188) on external
debt and current account deficits in Brazil is shown below:
max
C,I
∞∫
0
e−θtU(Ct)dt
subject to
B˙t = θBt + Ct + It [1 + ψ (It)]− F
(
Kt, L
)
, K˙t = It,
21See Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 58).
22See Blanchard and Fischer (1989, 60).
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where ψ
′
t > 0, Fk > 0 and Fkk > 0.
Blanchard (1983) notes that spending is the sum of consumption,C, and
investment spending, I, but the investment spending consists of investment
and installation costs, Itψ (It), where ψ(·) is an increasing function of I. The
country has current account deficits when the sum of spending,
Ct + It [1 + ψ (It)] ,
and interest on debt, θBt, exceeds output, F
(
Kt, L
)
. Here, initial values for
K0 and B0 are given.
In the extension of the above simple model, Blanchard (1983, 190) re-
laxes the assumptions so that the population grows at rate n, the rate of
discount may change over time, and time varying Harrod neutral technolog-
ical progress, βt, and a positive rate of capital depreciation, δ, time varying
discount rate, θ, and constant world interest rate, r, are introduced. In this
case, the extended model is
max
C,I
∞∫
0
LtU
(
Ct
Lt
)
e−
∫
t
0
θsdsdt
subject to
B˙t = Ct + It
[
1 + ψ
(
It
Kt
)]
+ rBt − F
(
Kt, Lte
−
∫
t
0
βsds
)
,
K˙t = It − δKt.
Semmler and Sieveking (2000, p. 1124) present an optimal control problem
of a resource-rich open economy with debt dynamics. The utility, which
is a function of consumption and renewable resource, is maximized with
constraints determined by the resource stock and foreign debt.
max
c,q
∞∫
0
e−δtU(R, c)dt
subject to
R˙ = g(r)− qR 0 ≤ q ≤ Q,
B˙ = h(B)− pf(qR) + c, 0 ≤ c ≤ C,
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where Rt denotes the resource stock, Bt is accumulated debt, qtRt stands
for the extraction rate of the resource, qt is the extraction rate, f is the
exportable goods’ production function, g is the reproduction function, and
h(B) is the interest payment on debt.
Open economy formulations often use the Dutch disease models. In the
1980’s, the phenomenon “Dutch disease” was in the center of interest. Do-
mestic sectors particularly manufacturing in certain countries, had declined
due to adverse effects of a resource boom. Corden (1984, p. 359) defines the
Dutch disease as “the adverse effects on Dutch manufacturing of the natu-
ral gas discoveries of the nineteen sixties, essentially through the subsequent
appreciation of the Dutch real exchange rate.”
Kremer (1986) examines the impacts of Dutch gas discovery on its small
and open economy with free international movement of capital. In the
Netherlands, gas exploitation required limited inputs. Capital inputs do
not seem to have put any pressure on other sectors. In the case of the Dutch
disease in the Netherlands, he states that the real exchange rate overshooting
models might be inapplicable and a model without inputs to the booming
sector should be considered.
Neary and Van Wijinbergen (1986) consider the effects of the discovery of
resources in a series of theoretical models and conclude that a resource boom
can lead to a real appreciation, i.e., an increase in the price of non-traded
goods relative to traded goods. In addition, all their models show deindus-
trialization, i.e., a decline in output and employment in the manufacturing
sector.
Mansoorian (1991) examines a problem of resource discovery and models
heavy borrowing in an optimizing framework. He shows that resource dis-
covery may cause a sharp deterioration in net foreign asset positions in the
long-run. Under the overlapping generation framework of Blanchard (I985),
Mansoorian (1991) presents a Dutch Disease model with three sectors, non-
traded, manufacturing and resource. While non-traded and manufacturing
goods are consumable, the resource sector’s output is exported.
The dynamics of the model are the current account, the rate of change of
aggregate expenditure, and the evolution of the difference between the price
of a title to a unit of factor (capital, specific factor, resource) and the partial
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derivative of the GDP function. As Mansoorian (1991) states, this procedure
is based on Blanchard (1985, pp. 228-9) and Matsuyama (1987, pp. 304-5).
The standard equation for current account is defined in Mansoorian (1991,
p. 1502) as:
B˙t = rBt + g(pt, L,K,R, T )− Zt,
where Zt is aggregate expenditure, Bt is aggregate bond holdings of the
economy at time t. In addition, g[p(t), L,K,R, T ] is the value of the gross
domestic product with the price of the non-traded good, p, labor, L, used in
non-traded and manufacturing sectors, capital, K, used in the extraction of
resources, R, and T is a specific factor.
Mansoorian (1991, p. 1499) states that in standard Dutch disease models
“if the resource sector is an integral part of the economy then a resource
discovery need not cause both real appreciation and deindustrialization.” He
further notes that as shown by Corden and Neary (1982) a resource dis-
covery may lead to real appreciation and pro-industrialization because the
extraction of new resources promotes production in manufacturing sector. In
contrast, Neary and Purvis (1982) emphasize a possibility of real depreciation
and de-industrialization because the extraction of new resources encourage
production of non-tradables. In his long-run modeling, Mansoorian (1991)
shows that real depreciation and pro-industrialization, that cannot be pre-
dicted by traditional Dutch disease as stated by Neary and Van Wijnbergen
(1986), is actually possible. This may happen because of the fall in aggregate
expenditure and in demand in non-tradables.
Eastwood and Venables (1982) analyze a macroeconomic response of a
country to the discovery of a large natural resource, e.g., the discovery of
oil in The North Sea. They assume zero extraction costs, that oil is per-
fectly tradeable, and that foreign currency denominated exogenous oil price
increases at the foreign interest rate. The model before the oil shock consists
of money market equilibrium, m, assumptions of perfect capital mobility and
perfect foresight in the foreign exchange market, r, demand function for do-
mestic output, d, demand determined output, y = d, and Phillips curve, p˙
(p. 287).
m = ϕy − λr + αp+ (1− α)e,
r = r∗ + e˙,
24
d = δ(e− p) + γy − σ(r − p˙),
y = d,
p˙ = β(y − y¯),
ϕ, λ, δ, γ, σ, β > 0; 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
They consider resource discovery as a “foreign exchange increment to national
wealth” (289) and show how demand is affected by the discovery. A demand
function, d, for domestic output before the resource discovery depends on the
relative prices of domestic, p, and imported goods with an exchange rate, e,
income, y, and the real interest rate with domestic interest rate of, r.
As a result of natural discovery, the demand function changes to
d = δ(e− p) + γy − σ(r − p˙) + η(f + e− p),
where (f + e− p) expression is the value of oil revenue in domestic currency
with elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to oil revenue denoted by η
(p. 290).
Analysis of the dynamic adjustment of the economy to a resource discov-
ery by Eastwood and Venables (1982) show that additional demand from oil
revenue results in exchange rate appreciation. They impose a slow price ad-
justment, with a “time lag between the resource discovery and the spending
of the resource revenue” and show that a “deflationary interval will follow
the initial exchange rate appreciation” (p. 297).
Hamilton (2001) examines whether a resource-abundant country con-
sumes wealth along the development path and whether the development of
the economy can be sustained. In his model, the supply of resources is con-
sidered as one of the inputs of domestic production. He develops a theoretical
approach to assess the sustainability path and provides empirical evidence on
that sustainability. Sustainability is measured by genuine savings, G, which
is the difference between the net national product and consumption as
G = GNP − C − δK − nsR− nl(h− g)− σe+ E,
where R stands for the depletion of subsoil resources, ns is the unit resource
rental rate, (h−g) is net depletion of living resources and its rental rate is nl,
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e is net pollution accumulation and its social marginal cost is σ; E denotes
the current educational expenditures.
According to Hamilton’s (2001) model of depletion and discovery of sub-
soil resources, negative genuine saving indicates that an optimal development
path is not sustainable. A resource extracting economy can be sustainable if
resource rents are invested in other productive assets. Hamilton derives the
net income and genuine saving and presents an optimal growth problem that
the present value of welfare, U , is maximized (pp. 47-48):
max
∞∫
t
U(Cs)e
−ρs ds.
The problem has several constraints in Hamilton (2001). When the gen-
uine savings are negative wealth is falling, in turn welfare will be declined as
shown (pp. 47-48):
U + UGG = ρW, UGG = ρ
∞∫
t
Use
−ρ(s−t) ds− U = W˙ .
Furthermore, in Hamilton (2001), domestic supply of resource, R, deple-
tion and accumulation for resource deposits, S, and cumulative discoveries,
D, are defined by
R =
N−1∑
i=1
Ri, S˙i = −R˙i, (i = 1, ..., N − 2, S˙N−1 = −RN−1 +D,
S˙N = −RN , Q˙ = D.
Foreign trade with foreign assets, A, repatriation of assets, M , fixed for-
eign interest rate, r, and international resource price path , can be expressed
by the following equation:
A˙ = rA+ pRN −M.
Domestic production function with fixed labor and population has two inputs
namely produced capital, K, and the supply of the resources, R, is F =
F (K,R). The supply and disposition in the economy is given by
F +M = C + K˙ +
N∑
i=1
fi(Ri) + ν.
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According to the efficiency condition for foreign trade, the domestic re-
source price, which is the marginal product of the resource, should be equal
to the international price:
FR = p.
Optimal time paths for C, R, D and M should be chosen as indicated in
Hamilton (2001).
1.5.4 Climate change effects
In the further extension of the open economy growth model with exhaustible
resources and backstop technology, as described earlier, the climate change
effects can be incorporated with additional constraints on greenhouse gases
(GHGs) and temperature.
Social welfare should be maximized with an effort towards the limitation
of environmental degradation. In Greiner et al. (2012a, p. 6) an increase in
GHGs is expressed by M :
M˙ = β1u− µ(M − κMo), M(0) =M0 ≥Mo,
µ ∈ (0, 1), β1 ∈ (0, 1).
where M0 is the pre-industrial level of the GHGs, u is the amount of fossil
fuels used, β1 is the part of the GHGs not taken up by oceans, and µ denotes
the inverse of the atmospheric lifetime of GHGs.
Bondarev et al. (2013) study a dynamic endogenous growth model that
considers both environmental and economic variables with technological
progress. They emphasize the importance of the efficiency of the technol-
ogy in an increase of the welfare. Their results show that less environmental
damage, which is less GHGs emissions and lower temperature increase, can
be generated from the endogenous technical change compared to exogenous
technical change.
In the model with environmental damage, Bondarev et al. (2013, p. 4) use
m for the GHG concentration in the atmosphere. It is increased by economic
activity, which has a weakening effect through controlled abatements and
exogenous improvement in cleaning technology. This constraint of GHG
concentration on the growth is shown as:
m˙t = −vmt + (1− at)etYt,
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where Yt denotes total output, v is the rate of recovery of the atmosphere
due to natural absorption, at is the abatement rate, and et is the reduction
of intensity of emissions from economic activities.
Besides using the GHG concentrations, Bondarev et al. (2013, p. 4) use
temperature as one of the constraints:
τ˙t = −λτt + d(mt),
where τt is the temperature increase from pre-industrial levels. This evolution
of the temperature is shown as a function of GHG concentration.
1.5.5 DICE model
Nordhaus (2008) presents a Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the
Economy (DICE) in the framework of growth theory. His model includes
natural capital and adds CO2 emissions, climate change impacts, climatic
damages, and climate-change policies. In his DICE-2007 model, there are
equations of damage, Ωt, abatement-cost function, Λt, total carbon emission,
Et (a sum of emissions from industry and land), mass of carbon in earth’s
“reservoir,” Mt (including atmospheric, upper ocean, and lower ocean), total
radiative forcing, Ft, global mean surface temperature, TAT,t, temperature
of lower ocean, TLO,t, and abatement cost as participation cost markup, πt
(which describes climate change effects and policy).23
Ωt =
1
1 + π1TAT,t + π2T 2AT,t
, Λt = πtθ1,tµ
θ2
t , Et = EInd,t + Eland,t,
EInd,t = σt(1− µt)AtK
γ
t L
1−γ
t ,
MAT,t = Et + ϕ11MAT,t−1 + ϕ21MUP,t−1,
MUP,t = ϕ12MAT,t−1 + ϕ22MUP,t−1 + ϕ32MLO,t−1,
MLO,t = ϕ23MUP,t−1 + ϕ33MLO,t−1,
Ft = η
{
log2
(
MAT,t
MAT,1750
)}
+ FEX,t,
TAT,t = TAT,t−1 + ξ1 {Ft − ξ2TAT,t−1 − ξ3 (TAT,t−1 − TLO,t−1)} ,
23See the model equations in the appendix of Nordhaus (2008, 205).
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TLO,t = TLO,t−1 + ξ4 (TAT,t−1 − TLO,t−1) , πt = φ
1−θ2
t ,
where µt is an emissions-control rate, φt denotes a participation rate, σt
is a ratio of uncontrolled industrial emissions to output, γ is an elasticity of
output with respect to capita, ξ is a temperature-forcing parameter, ϕ stands
for parameter of the carbon cycle, ψ is a parameter of damage function, θ is
a parameter of the abatement-cost function, and ξ is a parameter of climate
equations.
1.5.6 Clean technology
In Bondarev et al. (2013, p. 4) impose the following constraint of state of
technology with R&D investments, gt, on growth, which can be expected to
decline in the absence of investments:
x˙t = βgt − δ2xt.
Studies of growth models such as Acemoglu et al. (2012), stress the dis-
tinction between “clean” and “dirty” technologies and uses “endogenous and
directed technical change.” They use “dirty,”24 Yd, and “clean,” Yc, inputs
for the production of final goods and point out that “when inputs are suf-
ficiently substitutable, sustainable growth can be achieved with temporary
taxes/subsidies that redirect innovation toward clean inputs” (p. 131). The
aggregate production function with elasticity of substitution, ε,25 is given by
(p. 135)
Yt =
(
Y
(ε−1)/ε
ct + Y
(ε−1)/ε
dt
)ε/(ε−1)
.
One of the constraints on the growth model in Acemoglu et al. (2012, p.
137) is the evolution of the quality of the environment, St, as shown by:
St+1 = −ξYdt + (1 + δ)St,
where ξ denotes the rate of “environmental degradation” and δ stands for the
rate of “environmental regeneration.” Their findings suggest that when two
inputs are substitutes with high enough elasticity “immediate switch of R&D
resources to clean technology, followed by a gradual switch of all production
to clean inputs” is needed (p. 159).
24In Acemoglu et al. (2012), production with dirty input uses non-renewable resource.
25Acemoglu et al. (2012) assume that ε > 1 which implies substitutes of two sectors.
29
1.5.7 Public capital
The model can be extended by adding another constraint: evolution of public
capital. Semmler et al. (2007) study a relationship between the composition
of public expenditure and economic growth. Their model has private physical
capital, human capital and public capital. Public capital includes public
infrastructure, and health and education related facilities.
They use the following Cobb-Douglas production function for the market
goods with k as private capital, h is human capital, g is public capital and
only a part of it goes to private production of the market (v1g)
26
Akα(u1h)
β(ν1g)
γ.
In Semmler et al. (2007, p. 7), evolution of public capital is shown as:
g˙ = ifp + α1ep − (δg + n)g,
where ifp denotes foreign aid, α1 is a part of public resources used for new
public capital, ep is resources absorbed by the public sector, and δg is a
depreciation of public capital, and n is the growth rate of population.
1.5.8 Sovereign debt
Blanchard and Fischer (1989) point out that the government can be financed
not only by tax receipts, but also through borrowing from private sector.
As an additional constraint, sovereign debt dynamics can be imposed on the
growth.
The dynamic budget constraint is presented in Blanchard and Fischer
(1989, p. 54) as follows:
dbt
dt
+ nbt = gt − τt + rtbt,
where dbt/dt is an increase in per capita government debt bt, nbt is the debt
amount with population growth n, and the right hand side of the equation
shows the “excess of government outlays” with government purchases, gt,
and interest payment, rtbt, over tax receipts, τt.
26See Semmler et al. (2007, p. 4).
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Greiner et al. (2007, p. 3) use the public debt accumulation with real
public debt Bt ,
B˙(t) = Btrt − St = rBt +Gt − Tt,
where rt stands for real interest rate and St represents real government sur-
plus, Tt denotes tax revenue, and Gt is public spending excluding interest
payments.
Greiner et al. (2005, p. 165) show the breakdown of the per capita budget
constraint of the government in the following way:
B˙ = r2B + Cp + Tp + Ip − T − nB,
where r2 denotes the return to government bond or public debt of B, Cp is
public consumption, Tp are transfers, Ip is public investment, T stands for
tax revenue that equals T = τ(w+r1K+r2B) with income tax rate, τ , wage
rate, w, the return to physical capital,r1, and labor supply grows at the rate
of n.
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2 Macroeconomic performance
Resource booms, in general, can contribute to the economic development of
the resource abundant countries by raising a welfare of the country. Cross-
country comparison shows that the mining industry has contributed to a high
growth of certain resource-rich economies, for example in Latin America since
the 1990s, with increased foreign investment in mining and security of min-
ing investments. Wright and Czelusta (2007) discuss the economic growth of
Latin America particularly in Chile and Brazil (Exploration in South Amer-
ica, 2001). Although some of the mineral resource exporting countries have
succeeded, a number of studies indicate that some resource-rich countries
have worse growth performance compared to those without, mainly due to
side effects. In contrast to resource-rich countries, a number of resource-poor
countries, such as Singapore and South Korea, have promoted exports of
manufactured goods and achieved rapid economic growth. Certain resource-
rich countries have experienced adjustment problems including Dutch disease
and accumulation of external debt.
2.1 Natural resource and growth
Economists have been debating the relation of resource scarcity and economic
growth for many years. Barnett and Morse (1963) presented the first compre-
hensive theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of resource scarcity
on growth. Their comprehensive study presented three historical models:
The Utopian model with no resource scarcity, Malthusian scarcity with fixed
resource supply, and Ricardian scarcity with declining quality, where the
scarcity has a negative impact on economic growth. Following John Stuart
Mill’s argument that Ricardian model was more significant than the other
two models, Barnett and Morse (1963) consider and extend the Ricardian
model in their study. They state that in a Ricardian model “resources are
readily available, but only under conditions of declining economic quality”
and summarize the Ricardian economic growth model in the following way:27
1. There is “an endogenous, scale-induced decline in the economic quality
of freely available resource.
27The model is discussed in detail in Barnett and Morse (1963, pp. 107-115).
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2. The parameters are strictly invariant.
3. The social production function has constant returns to scale.
The important characteristics of the resource-abundant country are the
large export of natural resources. Based on deteriorating terms of trade in
1950’s, economists were concerned about the growth of economies rich in
natural resources (Prebisch, 1950 and 1964; Singer, 1950). Prebisch (1950)
in his study of Latin America along with Singer (1950) argue that developing
countries underperformed compared to industrialized countries mainly due
to specialization in primary commodities, slower technological progress in
this sector and deteriorating commodity terms of trade. A number of recent
studies show a negative relationship between natural resource abundance and
economic performance. These studies include Auty (1990, 1993, 2001), Sachs
and Warner (1995, 1999, 2001), and Smith (2004).
Sachs and Warner (1995) show a negative relationship between natural
resource abundance and economic growth during the period 1970-1990. Fur-
thermore, in extension of their research, Sachs and Warner (2001) show that
resource-abundant countries tended to have higher price levels. In addi-
tion, because of uncompetitive export sector resource-rich economies failed
to pursue export-led growth. They state that “almost without exception,
the resource-abundant countries have stagnated in economic growth since
the early 1970s, inspiring the term ‘curse of natural resources’. Empirical
studies have shown that this curse is a reasonably solid fact.” (Sachs and
Warner, 2001, p. 837).
In most of above mentioned studies, growth rate is taken as per capita
income, and resource abundance is measured as the ratio of primary product
exports to GDP or the share of primary products in total exports. There
also exist studies that propose measures of resource endowments other than
the export ratios. Consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, Leamer
(1984) suggests to use net exports of resources per worker as a proxy. Mal-
oney (2002), Lederman and Maloney (2003) use Leamer’s measure of resource
abundance in their analysis.
Maloney (2002, p. 1) argues that slow growth of resource-rich Latin
America was due to barriers to technological adoption and innovation. Led-
erman and Maloney (2003) emphasize the role of trade in growth of resource-
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rich economies. They show how a natural resource-abundant economy can
have a higher growth. Using data from 1975 to 1999, it is shown that the es-
timated coefficient on the Leamer index is strongly significant and positive in
panel estimation, but insignificant in cross section regressions. By examining
data on energy and mineral reserves, Stijins (2005) points out that natural
resource abundance was not a main contributor to the economic growth in
the period of 1970-1989. He argues that natural resource effect on growth
seem to take both positive and negative channels.
Manzano and Rigobon (2001) argue that in studies such as by Sachs
and Warner (1995, 2001), where a negative relationship between resource
abundance and growth is presented, there are two econometric problems:
“First, the result might depend on factors that are correlated with primary
exports but that have been excluded from the regression. Second, total GDP
includes the production in the resource sector that has been declining in the
last 30 years.”28 Their estimations use panel data and alternative measures
such as the “GDP net of resource exports” to solve these problems. According
to their findings, negative relationship is present only in cross-section data.
Manzano and Rigobon (2001) argue that low growth of the resource-rich
economy might be due to debt overhang.
2.2 Resource depletion
A number of early studies, including Hotelling (1931) and Barnett and Morse
(1963), were conducted on long-run availability of mineral resource. The
basic Hotelling rule indicates that net price should increase at the rate of
interest. This theoretical framework is used by economists to model the
supply and long-run price of the non-renewable resources (Livernois, 2009).
Barnett and Morse (1963) emphasize the distinction between economic
scarcity and physical availability of resources. They assess historical trends
of scarcity of natural resources for the United States from 1870 to 1957
and present the empirical evidence of decreasing scarcity29 for most of the
resources. Barnett and Morse (1963, p. 199) state that “the trend in the unit
28This is stated in Manzano and Rigobon (2001, p. 2).
29In the empirical test by Barnett and Morse (1963), the “trend of real cost of extractive
output” is used for measuring the scarcity of natural resources.
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cost of extractive goods as a whole has been down – not up.” Their data on
labor-capital cost per unit of output for minerals decreased over time from
average of 211 between 1870-1900 to 47 in 1957.
Barnett and Morse (1963) point out that the technological progress can
offset an increasing extraction cost that occurred due to an increase in de-
mand and depletion. An extension of this study by Barnett (1979) that con-
siders additional countries and updated data until 1970 yields similar results
of decreasing trend in labor per unit extracted. Similarly, other studies also
suggest that technological progress is crucial in overcoming resource scarcity
and can ensure efficient management of natural resources (Krautkraemer,
1998; Tilton, 2003).
Krautkraemer (1998, 6) points out that “technological progress has ame-
liorated the scarcity of natural resource commodities, but resource amenities
have become more scarce, and it is unlikely that technology alone can remedy
that.” He points out the distinction between natural resource commodities
and resource amenities. While natural resource commodities are used to
produce material goods and services, resource amenities include other goods
and services, such as the basic life support systems of the earth, the cli-
mate, the sinks, and the ecosystems, provided by the natural environment
(Krautkraemer, 1998, 9).
As production of exhaustible resources rises at a high speed, it will ul-
timately reach its peak point and will start falling until the resources are
depleted if necessary measures are not taken. According to the Peak-Oil
theory by Hubbert (1956), oil production in the United States has already
reached its peak in 1960s and started declining ever since. There are more
recent studies conducted on the peak of the oil including the Organization
for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO), Campbell and Laherrere (1998), Schindler
and Zittel (2008). Schindler and Zittel (2008) show that oil production of
major oil producing economies has reached its maximum level and in 2006
world oil production reached its peak.30
Production of mineral resources in particular fossil fuel such as oil, natural
gas and coal has been rising over time. Thus reserves-to-production (R/P)31
30See Schindler and Zittel (2008, p. 12).
31As defined in the BP Statistical Review (2012, p. 6), reserves-to-production shows
the length of time that those remaining reserves would last if production were to continue
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ratios of fossil fuel show a decreasing trend. According to the BP Statistical
Review (2012), world oil reserves at the end of 2011 reached 1652.6 billion
barrels that were sufficient to meet 54.2 years of global production. Oil
production as well as oil consumption has been growing in most regions
since early 1960s. While major producers of oil are Middle East, Europe and
Eurasia and North America, the majority of consumption in recent years
account for Asia Pacific followed by North America and Europe and Eurasia
(BP Statistical Review, 2012).
Due to the recovery of the global economy after the recent Global Fi-
nancial Crisis in 2008-2010, demand in mineral products has been increasing
substantially in the past several years. As a result, prices of mineral resources
on the world commodity market have increased which have led to the growth
of mining industry production and its exports. According to the BP Statis-
tical Review (2012), coal is the fastest growing source of fossil fuel and its
share of global energy consumption in 2011 reached 30.3 per cent which is
the highest share since 1969.
According to the BP Statistical Review (2012), world proved coal reserves
almost reached 861 billion tons in 2011, which were sufficient to provide 112
years of global production of coal. Coal has the largest R/P ratio compared
to other fossil fuels. However, the R/P ratio has been declining over time
and it fell from 2000 R/P of 210 years due to a rising production. In Asia
pacific region, particularly in China, coal production and consumption have
risen drastically accounting for almost half of the world’s coal.
2.3 Prices of natural resources
There is a wide range of literature on statistical trends in the long run prices
of resources. While some empirical studies demonstrate a rising trend of
the prices of resources, other studies present a declining trend, or even a U-
shaped pattern of the price. Empirical findings of Barnett and Morse (1963)
and Barnett (1979) show a relative decline in mineral prices. Other studies,
for example by Sullivan et al. (2000), claim a downward trend of resource
prices over the twentieth century.
Economists use extraction cost, price and user cost to measure resource
at that rate.
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scarcity. The advantage of the price is that they reflect the demand for the
resources (Brown and Field 1978; Fisher 1979). For non-renewable resources,
prices tend to rise as the scarcity increases. Early studies by Hotelling (1931)
and Solow (1974) suggest an increasing trend of prices. However, some of
the studies such as by Barnett and Morse (1963) did not show a rising trend
of the mineral prices over time. Later on, by using data between 1900 and
1973, Smith (1979) did not find any statistically stable trend in mineral
price index. However, a number of studies, such as by Slade (1982), Pindyck
(1978), Livernois and Uhler (1987), Swierzbinski and Mendelshohn (1989),
suggest a U-shaped mineral price trend.
As mentioned earlier, Hotelling (1931) rule indicates that price of oil in-
creases at the rate of interest rate that is used in discounting the profit.
However, Hotelling model is very basic and simple. As noted in Livernois
(2009, p. 23), Hotelling states that his basic model fails to take into account
an extraction cost of resources. If an extended Hotelling model includes ex-
traction costs, then the net price of the resource would rise at the interest
rate. In addition, the basic Hotelling model assumes a perfectly competitive
market. Thus, further modification of the model considers imperfect com-
petition, in particular a monopolistic market structure where a monopolist
resource owner can control the price of the resource at least to a certain
extent. Extensions of the Hotelling model that consider factors such as a
backstop technology, durability of the mineral, and recycling are shown in
Krautkraemer (1998) and Gaudet (2007) (Livernois, 2009, 24).
Livernois (2009, 23) points out that the most important empirical signif-
icance of the Hotelling rule is that “market price must rise over time in real
terms, provided that costs are time-invariant.” His empirical evidence sug-
gests that scarcity rent might be the least significant factor that influences
the price evolution. In addition to the Hotelling rule, other determinants
such as technological progress and market structure might have a more sig-
nificant role in price changes. Livernois (2009, p. 37) points out that “if the
Hotelling Rule is only one among many supply-side factors that influences
price, all kinds of price paths are possible.”
In the 1970s, a scarcity of natural resource attracted attention because
of events like the Arab embargo and oil price increases from oil exporting
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countries (Neary and Van Wijnbergen, 1986). In addition, report of the
Club of Rome “Limits to Growth”, which stressed the scarcity of minerals
and arable land as constraint to growth, was published (Meadows et al.,
1972).
Frankel (2011, pp. 6-7) compares different studies on price trends of the
resources and points out that upward or downward price trends seems possi-
bly connected with “the date of the end of the sample.” He summarizes that
“studies written after the commodity price increases of the 1970s found an
upward trend, but those written after the 1980s found a downward trend.”32
Frankel (2011, 6-7) lists studies such as Cuddington (1992), Cuddington et
al. (2007), Cuddington and Urzua (1989), Grilli and Yang (1988), Pindyck
(1999), Hadass and Williamson (2003), Reinhart and Wickham (1994), Kel-
lard and Wohar (2006), Balagtas and Holt (2009) and Harvey et al. (2010).
Prices of non-renewable resources are highly volatile compared to renew-
able resources such as agricultural products. Greiner et al. (2012b) using
dynamic programming and Nyambuu and Semmler (2014) using NMPC so-
lution methods show that in a model of optimal control with a monopolistic
resource owner the price will be monotonically rising if the initially known
stock is large and does not need to be discovered.
In the above model, the total stock of non-renewable resources consists
of known and unknown resources. As the known resource could not in-
crease, the extraction rate would decline. However, the optimal extraction
rate has an inverted-U shape when the initial stock is small. Since initially
known stock of resources is small, the extraction rate will rise due to a fur-
ther discovery of resources, and then will decline. In this case, the price of
exhaustible resources first declines and then rapidly increases indicating a
U-shaped path because the resource will be depleted eventually (Greiner et
al., 2012b; Nyambuu and Semmler, 2014).
Pindyck’s (1978) findings in show a U-shaped price evolution in the case
of the small initial stock of the reserve. Pindyck (1978, p. 841) notes that
“at first production will increase as reserves are developed, and later pro-
duction will decline as both exploratory activity and the discovery rate fall.”
The U-shaped price movement is also found in the optimal exploration and
32See Frankel (2011, pp. 6-7).
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extraction model by Liu and Sutinen (1982) where “net benefits of extraction
increase with an increase in the known resource stock and exploration costs
increase with an increase in cumulative exploration.”33
Slade’s (1982) empirical study of long-run price movements examines data
for the period of 1870-1978 for major metals and fuels of twelve commodities
except gold. Relative price34 is used as a proxy of resource scarcity. Her
model with exogenous technical change and endogenous change in the grade
of ores mined suggests a U-shaped pattern for relative prices. She incor-
porates cost-increasing degradation effects and cost-decreasing technological
progress in the Hotelling rule. Slade (1982) points out that mineral prices
can decline initially but eventually prices increase because the effects of cost
increase and price increasing effect of the Hotelling rule dominate the ef-
fects of cost-decreasing technological progress (Livernois, 2009, p. 24). Slade
(1982, p. 136) concludes that these results are consistent with findings of
Smith (1979) where linear-trend coefficient is unstable over time for all ag-
gregate prices including mineral sector. Empirical data indicate an upward
trend of prices of exhaustible resources in the long run. Energy Informa-
tion Administration Outlook releases the projection of fossil fuel prices up to
2040: this shows an upward price trend of all types of non-renewable energy.
Specifically, crude oil spot prices are predicted to grow faster in the long run.
2.4 Dutch disease
Mineral resource discoveries can lead to commodity export booms that can
have short-run monetary effects such as balance of payment surpluses and
accumulation of international reserves in the Central Bank. Edwards (1986)
presents a model of a resource-rich developing country and shows that com-
modity export booms result in short-run increase in money creation, inflation
and a real appreciation.
Corden and Neary (1982) examine a resource boom in natural gas and oil
and assess a decline in the traditional manufacturing sector. Their is a simple
model of a small open economy; it shows a fall in manufacturing output and
33See Liu and Sutinen (1982, 159-160).
34Relative price is defined as the ratio of an extractive-industry price index to an overall
price index (Slade, 1982, 123).
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employment, deteriorating balance of trade, and a fall in the real return to
factors concerned with manufacturing. In addition, they demonstrate a real
appreciation35 caused by the boom. In their analysis, they emphasize the
importance of the distinction between resource movement effects and the
spending effects of the boom in the study of the Dutch disease. These effects
are explained as follows:
“The boom in the energy sector raises the marginal products of the mobile
factors employed there and so draws resources out of other sectors, giving
rise to various adjustments in the rest of the economy, one mechanism of
adjustment being the real exchange rate. This is the resource movement
effect. If the energy sector uses relatively few resources that can be drawn
from elsewhere in the economy this effect is negligible and the major impact
of the boom comes instead through spending effect. The higher real income
resulting from the boom leads to extra spending on services which raises their
price (i.e. causes a real appreciation) and thus leads to further adjustments”
(see Corden and Neary, 1982, p. 827)
In the analysis of British and Australian resource booms, Forsyth (1986)
shows structural changes, Dutch disease effects in particular. While Australia
had a substantial resource movement effect, the resource boom in Britain was
characterized by a large spending effect. Primary production has been in-
creasing mainly due to the Common Agricultural Policy. The manufacturing
sector has declined dramatically since 1979. The service sector showed sig-
nificant growth. Thus, British economy seems consistent with Dutch disease
effects (Forsyth, 1986). Frankel (2011, p. 12) lists the following adverse
effects of the export commodity price boom that reflects Dutch disease:
• A large real appreciation in the currency.
• An increase in government spending.
• An increase in the price of non-traded goods, relative to traded goods.
• A shift of labor and land out of non-export-commodity traded goods.
• An increase in external debt.
35Real appreciation is calculated as an increase in the relative price of non-traded relative
to traded goods (Corden and Neary, 1982).
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2.5 External debt
Resource boom results in rapid increase in public spending and domestic
money supply. In order to finance spending and consumption, governments of
the mineral-exporting countries often borrow extensively from international
capital markets. For example, when Mexico discovered huge reserves of oil in
1977, the government expenditures were increased significantly. According
to Buffie and Krause (1989), Mexico’s total debt increased from USD 27.9
billion in 1977 to USD 87.6 billion in 1982 mainly due to lack of sufficient
savings. Harberger et al. (1985) note that the purpose of the large external
debt in some of the Latin American countries, such as Mexico, was to fund
consumption.
In comparison to some of the oil-exporting countries, Indonesia’s exter-
nal debt did not rise much in the late 1970s. In this way, Indonesia could
overcome the debt crisis of early 1980s (Warr, 1986). Frankel (2011, p.
17) suggests that debt crises of Mexico in 1982 and Indonesia, Russia and
Ecuador in 1998 with debt-service problem, could be avoided “if their debts
had been indexed to the oil price.”
As stated by Manzano and Rigobon (2001), in the 1970s, resource-rich
countries were encouraged to borrow against their mineral reserves because
of high commodity prices. However, in 1980’s when the prices dropped these
countries experienced debt crisis because they were unable to continue bor-
rowing and had to repay their debts. Manzano and Rigobon (2001) claim
that poor performance of the resource-abundant economies can be associated
with debt overhang.
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3 Decision making and strategic dependence
If economic growth is supposed to be sustainable, the depletion of natural
resources and the environmental effects of economic activities need to be
taken care of. Policies have to be developed that conserve resources and
preserve the environment such as natural resources, soil, air, water, climate,
and biodiversity. Yet, what we have not sufficiently considered so far is
decision making and policy options, for example environmental or carbon tax,
in a more complicated setting where one can observe that there is strategic
dependence between the decisions of agents. In this context, decision making
is mostly studied in some game theoretical set ups. Here then, in strategic
decision making, complicated issues arise concerning incentive compatible
decision and policy options on the micro as well macro level. We first study
prototype examples of strategic dependence which have been worked out first
on the firm level with respect to Cournot and Bertrand games. So we start
with static games. Then we introduce again models with growth and diverse
set ups for strategic decision making and discuss further policy options.
3.1 Strategic dependence
3.1.1 Static case
Dixit (1986) constructs the basic principles of a quantity-setting oligopoly, de-
picting the reactions and conjectures of oligopolists in a static simultaneous-
move game. This model has two particular merits. First, by specifying the
conjectures appropriately, it integrates many different and familiar models of
oligopolistic behavior into the same formal framework. These models include
Cournot, Bertrand, and the case with consistent or rational conjectures. Sec-
ond, the conjectural variations, treated as parameters, allow us to capture
the idea of varying degrees of competition. The basic principles of this model
are the following.
Let there be a set I of strategically interlinked agents in the economy.
Let yi be the output of agent i ∈ I and
y−i
.
= {yj|j ̸= i} = {yj|I \ i}
be the vector of the outputs of all the other agents j ̸= i. Agent i ∈ I faces
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the revenue function which is homogeneous of degree one:
ri(yi, y−i) with r
i
j
.
=
∂ri
∂yj
and rij
∣∣
yκ=y ∀κ∈[0,1]
= 1 for j ∈ I. (15)
When all agents j ∈ I increase their outputs yj in the same proportion, then
also their revenues rj increase in the same proportion.
Dixit’s (1986) main idea is to introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Agent i believes that another agent j ̸= i follows its choice
of output yi according to the conjectural variation relation
yi
yj
dyj
dyi
= v(yi, y−i, β) for j ̸= i, (16)
where the function v(yi, y−i, β) is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to
outputs (yi, y−i) and β is the expectations parameter.
Note that the cross elasticity (16) is symmetric for all agents i. The homo-
geneity of the function v means that when all agents j ∈ I increase their
outputs yj in the same proportion, then the anticipated elasticity of the out-
put yj of any other agent j ̸= i with respect to the output of agent i remains
constant.
Using the conjectural variation relation (16) when differentiating the rev-
enue function (15), one obtain the perceived marginal revenue for agent i:
mi(yi, y−i, β) = r
i
i(yi, y−i) +
∑
j ̸=i
rij(yi, y−i)
dyj
dyi
= rii +
∑
j
rijv(yi, y−i, β)
yj
yi
= rii(yi, y−i)
[
1 +
v(yi, y−i, β)
rii(yi, y−i)yi
∑
j ̸=i
rij(yi, y−i)yj
]
.
(17)
Because the function (15) is homogeneous of degree one, then its partial
derivative rij is homogeneous of degree zero. Noting this, (16) and (17), one
obtains the following result which will be useful later on:
Proposition 1 The perceived marginal revenue function mi(yi, y−i) is ho-
mogeneous of degree zero.
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The cross elasticity (16) characterizes conjectural variation. There is
perfect competition for v = 0 and full collusion for v = 1. In cases v ∈
(0, 1), the parameter v characterizes an agent’s subjective probability of the
possibility that the others j ̸= i will increase their output yj in response to
the an increase in the agent’s own output yi. The agents mimic Bertrand
behavior (19) for negative values v < 0: when any of them plans to increase
its output, it expects the others to decrease their output in order to prevent
their output prices from falling due to higher supply.
A special case of the conjectural variation is v(yj, y−j, β) ≡ β, where β is
a public policy instrument. If, for instance, the agents are oligopolists, then
the probability of their collaboration is decreased by anti-trust policy β.
3.1.2 Example: oligopolistic competition
The conjectural variation model can be applied to oligopolistic competition
as follows. Let us specify the revenue of agent i as follows:
ri(yi, y−i)
.
= pi(yi, y−i)yi − c
i(yi),
where
pi(yi, y−i) with p
i
j
.
= ∂ri/∂yj for j ∈ I
is the inverse demand function and c(yi) the cost function for agent i. The
model integrates the following cases into a unified framework:
Cournot: Agent j conjectures that the other agents j ̸= i hold their output
yj constant as it changes its output yi:
v(yi, y−i, β) ≡ 0, m
i = pi + piiyi. (18)
Competitive: Agent i conjectures that its own price pi will remain unchanged
as it changes its output yi. Differentiating
pi(yi, y−i) = constant
totally and noting (15) yield
0 = pii +
∑
j ̸=i
pij
dyj
dyi
= pii + v
∑
j ̸=i
pij
yj
yi
= pii
[
1 +
v(yi, y−i, β)
piiyi
∑
j ̸=i
pijyj
]
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and the expectations parameter β adjusts so that
v(yi, y−i, β) = −
piiyi∑
j ̸=i p
i
jyj
, mi = pi, (19)
holds true in the equilibrium.
Bertrand: Agent i conjectures that the other agents j ̸= i hold their prices
Rj constant as it changes its output yi. Differentiating
pj(yi, y−i) = p
j(yj, y−j) = constant
totally and noting (15) yield
0 = pji +
∑
κ ̸=i
pjκ
dyκ
dyi
= pji + v
∑
κ ̸=i
pjκ
yκ
yi
= pji
[
1 +
v(yi, y−i, β)
piiyi
∑
κ ̸=i
pjκyκ
]
and the expectations parameter β adjusts so that
v(yi, y−i, β) = −
piiyi∑
κ ̸=i p
j
κyκ
,
holds true in the equilibrium.
Collusion: Agent j conjectures that the other agents j ̸= i change their
output yj in proportion to its output yi:
v(yi, y−i, β) ≡ 1, m
j = pi +
I∑
j=1
pijyj.
The comparison of this result to the Cournot case (18) reveals that the
agents behave in this case as if they were a single monopoly producing
all goods i ∈ I.
3.2 Dirty investment
The simplest way of introducing economic growth is to assume that output is
produced from reproducible resources according to constant returns to scale.
The common way of doing this is the following (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
1995, section 1.3.1). Define labor as human capital that accumulates with
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education. Aggregating the two reproducible resources, human and physical
capital, into capital in general creates the AK production function where
output is produced in fixed proportion to capital.
Assume that agent i makes its output yi in fixed proportion to capital ki:
yi = ki. (20)
Agent i ∈ I accumulates capital ki by saving that is the difference of its
revenue ri and consumption ci:
k˙i
.
=
dki
dt
= ri(yi, y−i)− ci = r
i(ki, k−i)− ci, (21)
where t is time. Define the vector of the capital stocks of all the other agents
j ̸= i relative to the capital stock of agent i as follows:
k−i
ki
=
{
kj
ki
∣∣∣j ̸= i}. (22)
Assume v(yi, y−i, β) ≡ β, for simplicity. In that case, the function (17)
becomes
mi(yi, y−i, β) = r
i
i(yi, y−i)
[
1 +
β
rii(yi, y−i)yi
∑
j ̸=i
rij(yi, y−i)yj
]
,
∂mi
∂β
=
1
yi
∑
j ̸=i
rij(yi, y−i)yj > 0. (23)
The result ∂mi/∂β > 0 means that an increase in the intensity of competition
(i.e. the decrease of β) lowers the marginal revenue mi for all agents i ∈ I.
We assume that pollution is a by-product of capital accumulation. With
the awareness of environmental quality, individual preferences depend on
consumption ci and environmental quality ϕ. To obtain an explicit solution,
let us specify that function in the exponential form as follows:
U(ci, ϕ) = ϕ
νc1−θi /(1− θ), θ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞), ν > 0, (24)
where the parameter ν is the weight of environmental quality ϕ and θ the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. Furthermore, as-
sume that environmental quality ϕ is determined by
ϕ = eϵt/Φ(ki, k−i), 0 < ϵ < 1, Φj
.
=
∂Φ
∂kj
> 0, Φij
∣∣
kκ=k ∀κ∈[0,1]
= 1,
Φ linearly homogeneous, (25)
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where ϵ is a constant. This relation is equivalent to
ϕ˙
ϕ
=
log ϕ
dt
= ϵ−
1
Φ
∫
i∈I
∂Φ
∂kj
k˙jdi = ϵ−
1
Φ
∫
i∈I
Φj k˙jdi, (26)
where environmental quality ϕ improves with time, but deteriorates with any
investment k˙j in “dirty” capital for j ∈ I. If there is no investment, k˙j = 0
for all j, then the nature improves environmental quality at the rate ϵ.
Let ρ be the constant rate of time preference. Given (24), the intertem-
poral utility of agent i becomes∫ ∞
0
U(ci, ϕ)e
−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
ϕνc1−θi
1− θ
e−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
c1−θi
1− θ
e−δt
Φ(ki, k−i)ν
dt, (27)
where δ
.
= ρ − νϵ is a constant. Agent i maximizes its intertemporal utility
(27) by its consumption ci subject to production (20) and capital accumu-
lation (21), given the capital stocks of the others’, k−j. The Hamiltonian of
this maximization is
Hi = c
1−θ
i Φ(ki, k−i)
−ν/(1− θ) + µi[r
i(ki, k−i)− ci], (28)
where the shadow price µi for capital ki evolves according to [cf. (17) and
(20)]
µ˙i =
dµi
dt
= δµi −
∂Hi
∂ki
= [δ −mi(ki, k−i, β)]µi +
νc1−θi
1− θ
Φi(ki, k−i)
Φ(ki, k−i)ν+1
,
lim
t→∞
µikie
−δt = 0. (29)
The first-order condition for this maximization is
∂Hi
∂ci
=
c−θi
Φ(ki, k−i)ν
− µi = 0.
Given (29), this is equivalent to the Euler equation
c˙i
ci
= −
1
θ
[
µ˙i
µi
+ ν
Φi(ki, k−i)
Φ(ki, k−i)
]
=
1
θ
[
mi(ki, k−i, β)− δ −
1
µi
νc1−θi
1− θ
Φi(ki, k−i)
Φ(ki, k−i)ν+1
]
=
1
θ
[
mi(ki, k−i, β)− δ −
νci
1− θ
Φi(ki, k−i)
Φ(ki, k−i)
]
.
(30)
Because the revenue function ri and the environmental constraint Φ are
homogeneous of degree one and the perceives marginal revenue function mi
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homogenous of degree zero with respect to (ki, k−i), then the partial deriva-
tive Φi is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to (ki, k−i). In the sta-
tionary state, consumption ci and capital ki grow at the same rate. From
(21), (22) and (30) it then follows that
1
θ
[
mi
(
1,
k−i
ki
, β
)
− δ −
ν
1− θ
Φi(1, k−i/ki)
Φ(1, k−i/ki)
ci
ki
]
=
1
θ
[
mi(ki, k−i, β)− δ −
νci
1− θ
Φi(ki, k−i)
Φ(ki, k−i)
]
=
c˙i
ci
=
k˙i
ki
= ri
(
1,
k−i
ki
)
−
ci
ki
.
Solving for the propensity to consume ci/yi = ci/ki and noting (23), one
obtains
ci
ki
=
{
ri
(
1,
k−i
ki
)
+
1
θ
[
δ −mi
(
1,
k−i
ki
, β
)]}[
1−
ν/θ
1− θ
Φi(1, k−i/ki)
Φ(1, k−i/ki)
]−1
with
∂
∂β
(
ci
ki
)
= −
1
θ
∂mi
∂β
(
1−
ν/θ
1− θ
Φi
Φ
)−1
for i ∈ I.
This shows that there exists a stationary state in which all industries i ∈ I
grow at the same rate g: g = k˙j/kj for j ∈ I. In other words:
Proposition 2 For given initial capital stocks, ki(0) for i ∈ I, there exists a
stationary state where capital ki, output yi and revenue r
i grow at the same
rate for all agents i ∈ I.
In this stationary state, given (25) and (26), the function Φ grow at
the same rate g as all capital stocks ki, and environmental quality evolves
according to
ϕ˙
ϕ
= ϵ−
1
Φ
∫
i∈I
Φj k˙jdi = ϵ−
g
Φ
∫
i∈I
Φjkjdi = ϵ− g.
Proposition 3 If the natural abatement rate ϵ is higher (lower) than the
growth rate g, then environment improves ϕ˙ > 0 (deteriorates ϕ˙ < 0).
The analysis in this section shows that the AK model approach creates
a well-functioning model to analyze sustainable development. Its usefulness
depends on the justification of the assumption that output is produced from
reproducible resources according to constant returns to scale.
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3.3 Pigouvian taxation
The model of this subsection is a modification of the model in Palokangas
(2008). Let there be a fixed number n of similar agents. Agent i ∈ I
.
=
{1, ..., n} possesses a fixed amount L of labor, of which the amount li is used
in production and the rest zi in R&D:
L = li + zi. (31)
Emissions mi are in fixed proportion to inputs used in production, li, for each
agent j. By a proper choice of units, the emissions of agent i, mi, and total
emissions m can be written as follows:
mi = li, m
.
=
n∑
i=1
mi =
n∑
i=1
li. (32)
Each agent i ∈ {1, ..., n} produces a different good and competitive firms
produce a consumption good from all these goods according to
n∑
i=1
ci = y =
n∏
i=1
y
1/n
i , (33)
where ci is the consumption of agent j, yi the output of agent j, and y total
consumption in the union. With some complication, the same results can be
generalized for any neoclassical production function with constant returns to
scale. Let pi be the price for good j. With Cobb-Douglas technology (33),
the consumption price p is obtained by minimizing the unit cost
1
y
n∑
i=1
piyi =
n∑
i=1
pi
yi
y
of the consumption good by the input-output ratios (y1/y, ..., yn/y):
p = min
y1/y,...,yn/y
{ n∑
i=1
pi
yi
y
∣∣∣∣ n∏
i=1
(yi
y
)1/n
= 1
}
=
n∏
i=1
p
1/n
j .
Because in the model there is no money that would pin down the nominal
price level at any time, the consumption price p can be normalized at unity:
1 = p =
n∏
i=1
p
1/n
i . (34)
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Let t be time. It is assumed that total emissions m degrade, but the nature
improves environmental quality ϕ:
ϕ˙
.
=
dϕ
dt
= hϕ−m. (35)
3.3.1 The agents
Assume that all agents i ∈ {1, ..., n} share the same preferences, deriving
utility from their consumption ci and environmental quality ϕ. The utility
of agent i at time T is then given by
E
∫ ∞
T
1
1− σ
c1−σi ϕ
νe−ρ(t−T )dt, (36)
where E is the expectation operator, ρ > 0 the constant rate of time prefer-
ence, σ the constant rate of risk aversion and ν the wight of environmental
quality. The constant 1− 1− σ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant rate of risk aversion.
The efficiency of input li in production in agent j is a
γi , where a>1
is a constant and γi is the serial number of technology. In the advent of
technological change in agent j, this efficiency increases from aγi to aγi+1.
Total output in agent j is given by
yi = a
γili. (37)
In production, firms employ labor li up to the point where the wage wi is
equal to the output price pi times the marginal product of labor, ∂yi/∂li:
wi = pi
∂yi
∂li
= pia
γi . (38)
It is assumed that in a small period of time dt, the probability that
R&D leads to development of a new technology is given by λzidt, while the
probability that R&D remains without success is given by 1− λzidt, where
λ is the productivity of R& D. This defines a Poisson process qi with
dqi =
{
1 with probability λzidt,
0 with probability 1− λzidt,
(39)
where dqi is the increment of the process qi.
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It is assumed that the central planner imposes a uniform tax τ on the
product wimi of wages wi and emissions mi, and pays a uniform subsidy b
to labor income wiL throughout all agents j in the union. Thus, given (32),
(37) and (38), consumption in agent j is determined by
ci = piyi − τwimi + bwiL = pia
γi [(1− τ)li + bL], (40)
where piyi is income from production, τwimi emission taxes and bwiL subsi-
dies for labor. Noting (32), the central planner’s budget constraint is then
b
n∑
i=1
wiL = τ
n∑
i=1
wimi = τ
n∑
i=1
wili, (41)
where b
∑n
i=1wiL is subsidies and τ
∑n
i=1wimi emission taxes in the union.
Planner i ∈ {1, ..., n} forms expectations on the prospective responses of
the other agents ℓ ̸= j to its action. It anticipates the others ℓ ̸= j to
increase their emissions mℓ by the constant β ∈ (−∞, 1) units after it itself
has increased its emissions mi by one unit. This assumption and (32) imply
dlℓ/dli = dmℓ/dmi = β for all ℓ ̸= j and
m =M(li, n, β) with
∂M
∂li
= 1 +
∑
ℓ ̸=j
dlℓ
dli
= 1 + (n− 1)β. (42)
Here, M(li, n, β) is planner j’s perceived supply function of total emissions
in the union. Because in the model all agents i = 1, ..., n are in symmetric
position, they have the same perceived supply function (42). An agent takes
β as a constant, but at the level of the whole union the parameter β adjusts to
keep the perceived supply of emissions, M(li, n, β), equal to actual emissions
m for all planners i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
3.3.2 General equilibrium
Noting (42) and (35), agent i’s perceived pollution evolves according to
ϕ˙ = hϕ−M(li, n, β),
∂ϕ˙
∂li
= −
∂M
∂li
= −1− (n− 1)β. (43)
Agent i maximizes its utility (36) by consumption ci and labor input (li, zi)
subject to the resource constraint (31), Poisson technological change (39),
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the budget constraint (40), expectations (42) and pollution (43), on the as-
sumption that the price pi, the tax τ , the subsidy b and the parameter β
are kept constant. Using stochastic dynamic programming for this problem,
Palokangas (2008) obtains the following equilibrium condition:
(a1−σ − 1)λ+
ν
P
[1 + (n− 1)β] =
(1− τ)1− σ
(1− τ)li + bL
1
ϑi
=
(1− τ)1− σ
(1− τ)li + bL
[
ρ+ (1− a1−σ)λ(L− li) + ν
ϕ˙
ϕ
]
.
(44)
Because there is symmetry throughout agents i = 1, ..., n in the model,
noting (31), (32), (34) and (38), it is true that
li = l, zi = z = L− l, ci = c, M = m = nl, pi = p = 1, wi = a
γi . (45)
Given (33), (37) and (45), the consumption good is produced according to
ci = c =
y
n
=
1
n
n∏
i=1
y
1/n
i =
1
n
aγ
n∏
i=1
l
1/n
i =
l
n
aγ, γ
.
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
γi, (46)
where γ the serial number of the consumption-good technology. Because the
improvement of productivity aγi in the production of good j, (37), follows
the Poisson process (39), and because labor inputs li are constant over time
in the stationary state, then, given (33), the improvement of productivity in
the production y of the consumption good follows the Poisson process q with
dq =
{
1 with probability λ(L− l)dt,
0 with probability 1− λ(L− l)dt.
(47)
Thus, the expected growth rate of consumption y in the stationary state is
g
.
= E
[
log aγ+1 − log aγ
]
= (log a)λz = (log a)λ(L− l), (48)
where E is the expectation operator. Noting (45), the budget constraint (41)
changes into
b = τ
n∑
i=1
wili
/(
L
n∑
i=1
wi
)
=
τ l
L
. (49)
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Finally, given (45), the evolution of environmental quality (43) becomes
ϕ˙ = hϕ− nl with ∂ϕ˙/∂l = −n. (50)
I consider the stationary state in which labor inputs (li, zi) are kept constant
over time. In that case ϕ is constant as well, and given (50), the following
conditions hold true:
ϕ˙ = 0, hϕ = nl. (51)
Inserting (45), (49) and (51) into (44) and solving for l, one obtains the
equilibrium level of emissions in the stationary state:
l =
1/n+ (1− 1/n)β
(1− τ)1− σ − 1
νh/λ
a1−σ − 1
+
(1− τ)1− σ
1− (1− τ)1− σ
(
ρ/λ
a1−σ − 1
− L
)
. (52)
3.3.3 Pareto optimum
Noting (32) and (46), the welfare in the union takes the form
U(c,m, T ) =
∫ ∞
T
1
1− σ
a(1−σ)γnσ−1l1−σϕνe−ρ(t−T )dt, (53)
The central planner maximizes this by labor in production, l, subject to
technological change (47) and the dynamics of pollution (50). Using stochas-
tic dynamic programming for this problem, Palokangas (2008) obtains the
Pareto-optimal level of emissions, l∗:
l∗
.
=
(a1−σ − 1)−1
σλ
{
(σ − 1)
[
ρ+ (1− a1−σ)L
]
− hν
}
,
∂l∗
∂(hν)
< 0. (54)
Noting (48) and (54), the Pareto-optimal growth is g∗ = (logA)(L− l∗), for
which ∂g∗/∂(hν) > 0. This result can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 4 The Pareto-optimal growth rate g∗ is the higher, the more
environmental quality is liked (i.e. the bigger ν), or the higher the absorption
rate of pollution, h.
R&D spending for clean production promote economic growth. A high ab-
sorption rate eases the constraint for the central planner and boosts growth.
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The central planner sets the tax parameter τ to establish the Pareto
optimum l = l∗. Given ρ+ (1− a1−σ)λL < 0, (52) and (54), one obtains
τ ∗
.
=
1− β
1− σ
(
1−
1
n
) σhν/[ρ+ (1− a1−σ)λL]
1− hν/[ρ+ (1− a1−σ)λL]
> 0,
∂τ ∗
∂(hν)
< 0. (55)
Thus, the following result is obtained:
Proposition 5 The optimal emission tax τ ∗ [cf. (55)] increases with the
number n of agents. When the union is a single jurisdiction, n = 1, the
tax is zero. The tax is the lower, the greater is the other agent’s anticipated
response β. The less environmental quality is liked (i.e. the smaller ν) or
the smaller the absorption rate of pollution, h, the higher the emission tax.
The more agents (i.e. the bigger n), the higher proportion of the emissions
of an agent falls upon the other agents and the less an agent is willing to
reduce emissions. Thus, a higher tax is needed to make a agent to reduce its
emissions. Noting (42) and the symmetry li/m ≈ 1/n, the elasticity of total
emissions m with respect to emissions in a single agent li is given by
li
m
∂M
∂li
= [1 + (n− 1)β]
li
m
≈
1
n
+
(
1−
1
n
)
β.
With estimating this elasticity, one can estimate β. The more a agent expects
the others to follow its policy (i.e. the bigger β), the less space it has for
raising its emissions and the smaller tax (55) is adequate for reducing its
emissions. Preferring pollution (i.e. a high ν) or high absorption rate h
strengthens the welfare effect of the tax. In that case, a smaller tax τ ∗ is
needed for maintaining the Pareto optimum, ∂τ ∗/∂(hν) < 0.
3.4 Negotiation games
Because there is no worldwide benevolent central planner, the problem is
to find out how the agents could cooperate to mimic the Pareto-optimum.
A key to such cooperation is mutual confidence: once the agents reach an
agreement on the coordination of their behavior, each of them must trust that
the other will not cheat and renege. Reputation could be a basis for mutual
confidence. Because the agents gain reputation by their behavior, a successful
cooperation today in alleviating global warming creates confidence that helps
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to run such cooperation in future. Thus, international climate policy might
be constructed as a learning process which, on certain conditions, can lead
to full confidence and a Pareto optimum in future.
Haurie et al. (2006) have constructed the necessary optimality conditions
for the following negotiation game:
1. The accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere in
exogenously constrained.
2. An agreement must be reached on the relative development paths of the
different countries and their use of GHGs to foster their development.
3. GHGs are by-products of economic production process.
4. There must be a non-cooperative equilibrium of the strategic game
between the countries.
Theories for environmental policy commonly assume benevolent policy
makers. In a coalition of countries, however, international agencies tend to
be self-interested, thus being prone to lobbying from the member countries.
This interplay brings an additional flavor to the maintenance of sustainable
development. Lobbying can be modelled either by the all-pay auction model,
in which the lobbyist making the greater effort wins with certainty, or by the
menu-auction model, in which the lobbyists announce their bids contingent
on the politician’s actions. In the all-pay auction model, lobbying expendi-
tures are incurred by all the lobbyists before the planner takes an action A
good example of this is Johal and Ulph (2002) in which local interest groups
lobby to influence the probability of getting their favorite type of government
elected. In the menu-auction model, it is not possible for a lobbyist to spend
money and effort on lobbying without getting what he lobbied for. Because
the menu-auction model characterizes better the case in which the central
planner’s decision variables (regulatory constraints, subsidies) are continuous
– so that the interest groups obtain marginal improvements in their position
by lobbying – it is chosen as a starting point in this document.
Palokangas (2009, 2014) have extended Haurie’s (2006) framework so that
the constraint on global emissions is not given, but endogenously determined
by negotiation between the countries and the international agency before
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environmental policy takes place. In that case, the entire negotiation game
starts from the determination of emission caps rather than from its subgame
starting from the imposition of emission caps.
3.4.1 The economy
There is large number (“continuum”) of economic agents that are placed
evenly in the limit [0, 1]. They have different endowments of labor and land,
different productions functions in manufacturing and different technology in
R&D. Their emissions have different impacts on global pollution. All agents
produce the same consumption good from land, labor and energy. That good
is chosen as the numeraire in the model, for convenience.
Each agent i ∈ [0, 1] supplies land Ai and labor Li inelastically, and
devotes li units of labor to production and the remainder
zi = Li − li (56)
to R&D. There exists an emitting input called energy the extraction costs
of which are ignored, for simplicity. It is assumed that emissions are pro-
portional to the use of energy, mi, in each agent i. Pollution m is a linearly
homogeneous function M of the emissions of all agents i ∈ [0, 1]:
m =M
(
mi| i ∈ [0, 1]
)
, M homogeneous of degree one. (57)
In global warming problems, it is the stock of GHGs that causes damages
and not the flow. In this document, however, the flow is used instead to
simplify the dynamics. In the model, pollution affects the economy in two
ways. First, pollution decreases utility globally. Second, local pollution
harms local production. Except realism, there is also a technical reason
to introduce the “local” effect: it enables the existence of the laissez-faire
equilibrium in the case there is no international agent running emission policy.
To enable that the agents can increase their efficiency and consequently
grow at different rates in a stationary-state equilibrium, we eliminate
• the terms-of-trade effect by the assumption that all agents produced
the same internationally-traded good, and
• international capital movements by the assumption that all agents
share the same constant rate of time preference, ρ.
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3.4.2 Single agents
Production
When agent i develops a new technology, it increases its productivity by
constant proportion ai > 1. The level of productivity in agent i is then equal
to ai
γi , where γi is its serial number of technology. The innovation of new
technology in agent i increases γi by one.
Agent i produces its output yi from land Ai, labor li and energy mi. It
is assumed that local emissions, which are proportional to energy input mi,
harm local production.36 It is furthermore assumed that labor li and energy
mi form a composite input ϕ
i(li,mi) through CES technology, but otherwise
there is Cobb-Douglas technology:37
yi = ai
γif i(li,mi)m
−ζ
i , f
i(li,mi)
.
= A1−αii ϕ
i(li,mi)
αi , 0 < αi < 1, ζ > 0,
f il > 0, f
i
m > 0, ϕ
i
l > 0, ϕ
i
m > 0, ϕ
i
ll < 0, ϕ
i
mm < 0, ϕ
i
lm > 0, (58)
where the subscripts l and m denote the partial derivative of the function
with respect to li and mi, respectively, ai
γi is total factor productivity, αi a
parameter and ζ is the constant elasticity of output with respect to emissions
mi. The higher ζ, the more local emissions mi harm local production.
When the markets are perfect in agent i, one can interpret 1− αi as the
expenditure share of land and αi that of labor and energy taken together.
Noting (58), the expenditure shares of energy and labor in production are
mif
i
m(li,mi)
f i(li,mi)
= αi
miϕ
i
m(li,mi)
ϕi(li,mi)
= αi
ϕim(li/mi, 1)
ϕi(li/mi, 1)
.
= ϖi
(
li
mi
)
∈ (0, αi),
lif
i
l (li,mi)
f i(li,mi)
= αi
liϕ
i
l(li,mi)
ϕi(li,mi)
= αi
[
1−
miϕ
i
m(li,mi)
ϕi(li,mi)
]
= αi −ϖ
i
(
li
mi
)
∈ (0, αi). (59)
36Without this assumption, agent i would use an indefinitely large amount of energy in
the case of laissez-faire (cf. section 3.4.3).
37The use of a general production function yi = a
γi
i F (Ai, li,mi) would excessively com-
plicate the analysis.
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Because the composite input ϕi(li,mi) is a CES function, one obtains
(ϖi)′
(
li
mi
)
=
dϖi
d(li/mi)
{
> 0 for 0 < σi < 1,
< 0 for σi > 1,
(60)
where σi is the constant elasticity of substitution between inputs li and mi.
Research and development (R&D)
An increase in productivity in agent i, ai
γi [cf. the production function
(58)], depends on labor devoted to R&D, zi, in that agent: the probability
that input zi leads to development of a new technology with a jump from γi
to γi+1 in a small period of time dθ is given by λizidθ, while the probability
that input zi remains without success is given by 1− λizidθ, where λi > 0 is
a constant. Noting (56), this defines a Poisson process qi with
dqi =
{
1 with probability λizidθ,
0 with probability 1− λizidθ,
zi = Li − li, (61)
where dqi is the increment of the process qi.
Preferences
All agents have the same preferences: the expected utility of agent i ∈
[0, 1] starting at time T is given by
E
∫ ∞
T
cim
−δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ, δ > 0, ρ > 0, (62)
where E is the expectation operator, θ time, ci consumption in agent i, ρ the
constant rate of time preference and δ the constant elasticity of temporary
utility with respect to economy-wide emissions m. The lower ρ, the more
patient the agents are. Total pollution m decreases welfare in all agents
i ∈ [0, 1], but a single agent is so small that it ignores this dependence. The
higher δ, the more pollution m is disliked.
3.4.3 Laissez-faire
Because all agents i ∈ [0, 1] produce the same consumption good, then, with-
out GHG emissions management, each agent i consumes what it produces,
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ci = yi. Noting (58) and ci = yi, the expected utility of the agent starting at
time T , (62), becomes
Υi = E
∫ ∞
T
yim
−δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ = E
∫ ∞
T
aγii f
i(li,mi)m
−ζ
i m
−δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ. (63)
Assume for a while that energy input mi is held constant. Agent i then max-
imizes its expected utility (63) by its labor devoted to production, li, subject
to its technological change (61), given pollution m. Palokangas (2014) shows
by stochastic dynamic programming that the solution of this maximization
is the following:
Proposition 6 The expected utility of agent i is
Υi = m−δΠi(γi,mi, T ), for which
∂Πi
∂mi
=
Πi
mi
[
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
− ζ
]
.
(64)
Agent i chooses its labor input li so that
(ai − 1)λili
ρ+ (1− ai)λi(Li − li)
= αi −ϖ
i
(
li
mi
)
. (65)
In the presence of laissez-faire, agent i can optimally determine its energy
input mi as well: it maximizes the value of its program, Υ
i, by mi. Given
(64), this leads to the first-order condition
∂Υi
∂mi
= m−δ
∂Πi
∂mi
= m−δ
Πi
mi
[
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
− ζ
]
= 0 and ϖi
(
li
mi
)
= ζ. (66)
The second-order condition of the maximization is given by
∂2Υi
∂m2i
= − m−δ
Πi
mi︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(ϖi)′
li
m2i︸︷︷︸
+
< 0 and (ϖi)′ > 0.
Given this and (60), labor and energy are gross complements, 0 < σi < 1,
and (ϖi)′ > 0 holds true everywhere. From this, (65) and (66) it follows that
(ai − 1)λil
L
i
ρ+ (1− ai)λi(Li − lLi )
= αi − ζ, ϖ
i
(
lLi
mLi
)
= ζ with (ϖi)′ > 0, (67)
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where the superscript L denotes the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Given (31), (58), (59) and (67), it then holds true that
ρ+ (1− ai︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
)λi(Li − l
L
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
) ξi︸︷︷︸
∈(0,1)
> ρ+ (1− ai)λi(Li − l
L
i ) > 0,
(ai − 1)λil
L
i
ρ+ (1− ai)λi(Li − lLi )
< αi − β < αi < 1, ρ+ (1− ai)λiLi > 0. (68)
Noting (31), (67) and (68) yield
d
dlLi
log
[
(ai − 1)λil
L
i
ρ+ (1− ai)λi(Li − lLi )
]
=
1
lLi
[
1−
(ai − 1)λil
L
i
ρ+ (1− ai)λi(Li − lLi )︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1)
]
> 0 and
d
dlLi
[
(ai − 1)λil
L
i
ρ+ (1− ai)λi(Li − lLi )
]
> 0.
Noting this and differentiating the left-hand equation in (67), one obtains
d
dlLi
[
(ai − 1)λil
L
i
ρ+ (1− ai)λi(Li − lLi )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
dlLi + dβ = 0
and dlLi /dβ < 0. Given (31), this implies dz
L
i /dβ = −dl
L
i /dβ > 0. Finally,
differentiating the right-hand equation in (67), and noting (67), one obtains
dmLi
dβ
=
mLi
lLi
[
dlLi
dβ︸︷︷︸
−
−
mLi
(ξi)′︸︷︷︸
+
]
< 0.
Thus, the following result is proven:
Proposition 7 The more emissions harm locally (i.e. the higher ζ), the less
there are emissions mLi , dm
L
i /dζ < 0, and the more there is R&D (i.e. the
higher zLi ), dz
L
i /dζ > 0.
Because technological change generated by R&D decreases the need for pol-
luting energy, there are incentives to perform R&D.
3.4.4 The central planner
Grandfathering means that emission caps have a base that is determined by
the history, but updated over time. In models with discrete time, that base
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would be calculated by a moving average of past emissions. In the quality-
ladders model of this document where time is continuous, the base is specified
as follows. The central planner sets the pollutant caps in fixed proportion ε
to the energy input of that agent under previous technology, m̂i:
mi ≤ εm̂i for i ∈ [0, 1] and ε > 0. (69)
If the current number of technology is γi, then the allocation base m̂i is calcu-
lated by energy input under previous technology γi−1 (cf. subsection 3.4.2).
If the central planner tightens emission policy by decreasing ε below one,
then the constraint (69) becomes binding for all agents i ∈ [0, 1]. Because
the function M in (57) is linearly homogeneous, one then obtains:
mi = εm̂i for i ∈ [0, 1], m = εm̂, m̂
.
=M
(
m̂i| i ∈ [0, 1]
)
. (70)
Thus, there is only one policy parameter ε in the grandfathering scheme.
The central planner can be benevolent or self-interested, but in both cases
it chooses its grandfathering policy parameter ε from the class of technology-
invariant controls: this is independent of technology changes in all agents.
3.4.5 The Pareto optimum
Because all agents i ∈ [0, 1] produce the same consumption good, total con-
sumption is equal to total production,
∫ 1
0
cidj =
∫ 1
0
yidj. To construct the
Pareto optimum, let us introduce a benevolent central planner that maxi-
mizes the welfare of the representative agent of the economy,W . Given (62),
(63), (64) and
∫ 1
0
cidj =
∫ 1
0
yidj, that welfare is
W
.
=
∫ 1
0
[
E
∫ ∞
T
cim
−δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ
]
dj = E
∫ ∞
T
(∫ 1
0
cidj
)
m−δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ
= E
∫ ∞
T
(∫ 1
0
yidj
)
m−δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ = E
∫ ∞
T
(∫ 1
0
yim
−δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ
)
dj
=
∫ 1
0
Υidj = m−δ
∫ 1
0
Πi(γi,mi, T )dj (71)
which should be maximized by the policy parameter ε. Given (64) and (70),
this leads to the first-order conditions
0 =
dW
dε
= m−δ
∫ 1
0
∂Πi
∂mi
∂mi
∂ε︸︷︷︸
=m̂i
dj − δm−δ−1
∂m
∂ε︸︷︷︸
=m̂
∫ 1
0
Πidj
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= m−δ
[∫ 1
0
∂Πi
∂mi
m̂idj − δ
m̂
m
∫ 1
0
Πidj
]
= m−δ
{∫ 1
0
Πi
[
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
− ζ
]
m̂i
mi
dj − δ
m̂
m
∫ 1
0
Πidj
}
= m−δ
∫ 1
0
Πi
{[
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
− ζ
]
m̂i
mi
− δ
m̂
m
}
dj. (72)
In the stationary state, all inputs (li,mi) for all agents i ∈ [0, 1] must be
constant. Once the economy attains the stationary state, the emissions under
the previous and current technology become equal: m̂ = m and m̂i = mi for
i ∈ [0, 1]. Plugging these conditions and into (72) yields
0 = m−δ
∫ 1
0
Πi
[
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
− ζ − δ
]
dj. (73)
Because the expected utilities Πi for i ∈ [0, 1] are random variables, then,
given (73), the only possible stationary state that corresponds to a technology-
invariant control ε is
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
= ζ + δ for i ∈ [0, 1]. (74)
The equilibrium conditions (65) for the agents i ∈ [0, 1] as well as those (74)
for the central planner can be written as
ϖi
(
lPi
mPi
)
= ζ + δ,
(a− 1)λil
P
i
ρ+ (1− a)λi(Li − lPi )
= αi − ζ − δ, (75)
where the superscript P denotes the Pareto optimum equilibrium.
The comparison of (75) with (67) shows that the introduction of a benev-
olent central planner increases the parameter ζ up to ζ + δ in the system.
Thus, Proposition 7 has the following corollary:
Proposition 8 A shift from laissez-faire to the Pareto optimum decreases
emissions, mPi < m
L
i , and increases R&D, z
P
i > z
L
i .
The introduction of a benevolent central planner internalizes the negative
externality through emissions. This increases incentives to perform R&D.
With the uniform proportionality rule ε, all agents face the same marginal
benefits from pollutants via allocation in subsequent periods. In contrast
to Bo¨ringer and Lange (2005), the regulatory cap mP is not exogenous but
endogenously determined.
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3.4.6 Regulation
In this section, agents i ∈ [0, 1] lobby the central planner over the policy
parameter ε. Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), it is assumed that
the central planner has its own interests and collects political contributions
Ri from agents i ∈ [0, 1]. This is a common agency game, the order of which is
then the following (cf. Grossman and Helpman 1994, and Dixit et al. 1997).
First, the agents i ∈ [0, 1] set their political contributions Ri conditional on
the central planner’s prospective policy ε. Second, the central planner sets
its technology-invariant policy variable ε and collects the contributions from
the agents. Third, the agents maximize their utilities. This game is solved
in reverse order.
Optimal program
Agent i pays its political contributions Ri to the central planner. It is
assumed, for simplicity, that the central planner consists of civil servants who
inhabit agents i ∈ [0, 1] evenly. Thus, the agents gets an equal share R of
total contributions,
R
.
=
∫ 1
0
Ridj
/∫ 1
0
dk =
∫ 1
0
Ridj. (76)
Noting the production function (58), consumption in agent i is then
ci = yi +R−Ri = a
γi
i f
i(li,mi)m
−ζ
i +R−Ri, (77)
where yi is income from production and R − Ri net revenue from political
contributions in agent i. Noting (77), the expected utility of agent i starting
at time T , (62), becomes
Θi = E
∫ ∞
T
[
aγii f
i(li,mi)m
−ζ
i +R−Ri
]
m−δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ. (78)
Agent imaximizes its expected utility (78) by its labor devoted to produc-
tion, li, subject to technological change in the agent, (61), given the emission
cap mi, pollution m and political contributions Ri and R. Using stochastic
dynamic programming, Palokangas (2014) proves the following result:
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Proposition 9 The solution for the optimal program maxli Θ
i is the function
Θi(mi,m,R,Ri, γi),
∂Θi
∂mi
= m−δ
Γi(γi,mi, T )
mi
[
ϖi
(
l∗i
mi
)
− ζ
]
,
∂Θi
∂m
= −δm−δ−1
(
Γi +
R−Ri
ρ
)
, −
∂Θi
∂Ri
=
∂Θi
∂R
=
m−δ
ρ
, (79)
where the random variable Γi is the expected value of the flow of output for
agent i and l∗i is the optimal labor input in production for which
(ai − 1)λil
∗
i
ρ+ (1− ai)λi(Li − l∗i )
= αi −ϖ
i
(
l∗i
mi
)
. (80)
The political equilibrium
Because each agent i affects the central planner by its contributions Ri,
its contribution schedule depends on the central planner’s policy ε [cf. (76)]:
Ri(ε) for i ∈ [0, 1], R(ε)
.
=
∫ 1
0
Rk(ε)dk. (81)
The central planner maximizes present value of the expected flow of the
political contributions R from all agents i ∈ [0, 1]:
G(R)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
Re−θ(θ−T )dθ =
R
ρ
. (82)
Each agent i maximizes its expected utility Θi [cf. (79)].
According to Dixit at al. (1997), a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
this lobbying game is a set of contribution schedules Ri(ε) and a policy ε
such that the following conditions (i)− (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Ri are non-negative but no more than the contributor’s
income, Θi ≥ 0.
(ii) The policy ε maximizes the central planner’s welfare (82) taking the
contribution schedules Ri(ε) as given,
ε = argmax
ε
G
(
R(ε)
)
= arg max
ε∈[0,1]
R(ε). (83)
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(iii) Agent i cannot have a feasible strategy Ri(ε) that yields it a higher level
of utility than in equilibrium, given the central planner’s anticipated
decision rule (70),
ε = argmax
ε
Θi
(
mi,m,R,Ri(ε), γi
)
with mi = εm̂iand m = εm̂. (84)
Because the agent is small, it takes the total contributions of all agents,
R, as given. However, the agent observes the dependency of pollution
m on environmental policy ε [cf. (70)].
(iv) Agent i provides the central planner at least with the level of utility
than in the case it offers nothing (Ri = 0), and the central planner
responds optimally given the other agents contribution functions,
G
(
R(ε)
)
≥ max
ε
G
(
R(ε)
)∣∣∣
Ri=0
.
The stationary state
Noting (79), the conditions (84) for agents i ∈ [0, 1] is equivalent to
0 =
dΘi
dε
=
∂Θi
∂Ri
dRi
dε
+
∂Θi
∂mi
∂mi
∂ε︸︷︷︸
=m̂i
+
∂Θi
∂m
∂m
∂ε︸︷︷︸
=m̂
=
∂Θi
∂Ri
dRi
dε
+
∂Θi
∂mi
m̂i +
∂Θi
∂m
m̂
= −
m−δ
ρ
dRi
dε
+m−δΓi
[
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
− ζ
]
m̂i
mi
− δm−δ
(
Γi +
R−Ri
ρ
)
m̂
m
and
1
ρ
dRi
dε
= Γi
[
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
− ζ
]
m̂i
mi
− δ
(
Γi +
R−Ri
ρ
)
m̂
m
for i ∈ [0, 1]. (85)
Once the economy attains the stationary state, the emissions under the previ-
ous and current technology become equal: m̂ = m and m̂i = mi for i ∈ [0, 1].
Plugging these conditions into (85) yields
1
ρ
dRi
dε
=
[
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
− ζ
]
Γi − δ
(
Γi +
R−Ri
ρ
)
for i ∈ [0, 1].
Noting these equations and (81), the government’s equilibrium condition (83)
is equivalent to
0 =
dR
dε
=
∫ 1
0
dRi
dε
dj = ρ
∫ 1
0
{[
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
− ζ
]
Γi − δ
(
Γi +
R−Ri
ρ
)}
dj
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= ρ
{∫ 1
0
[
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
− ζ − δ
]
Γidj −
δ
ρ
∫ 1
0
(R−Ri)dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
}
= ρ
∫ 1
0
[
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
− ζ − δ
]
Γidj. (86)
In the stationary state corresponding to the technology-invariant control
ε, all inputs (li,mi) for all agents i ∈ [0, 1] must be constant. Because the
expected value of the flow of output, Γi is a random variable for all agents
i ∈ [0, 1], then, given (86), the only possible stationary state in the economy
of agents i ∈ [0, 1] is
ϖi
(
li
mi
)
= ζ + δ for i ∈ [0, 1]. (87)
This means that if agent i ∈ [0, 1] has confidence on stable development, then
it expects that its expenditure share of energy, ϖi, will be equal to ζ + δ in
the long run. From the equilibrium conditions (80) of the agents i ∈ [0, 1] as
well as those (87) of the central planner, one obtains
ϖi
(
lGi
mGi
)
= ζ + δ,
(ai − 1)λil
G
i
ρ+ (1− ai)λi(Li − lGi )
= αi − ζ − δ, (88)
where the superscript G denotes grandfathering of emissions.
Comparing the systems (75) and (88) yields the following result:
Proposition 10 Regulation leads to the Pareto optimum, (lGi ,m
G
i ) = (l
P
i ,m
P
i )
for i ∈ [0, 1].
The introduction of a self-interested central planner has the same impact
as that of a benevolent central planner: it internalizes the externality of
emissions through pollution, leading to the Pareto optimum.
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4 Conclusions
Different definitions of the sustainability concern the environmental impacts
of current economic activities on future activities as well as the availability of
resources for future generations. Factors of production include not only labor,
physical capital, and land, but also limited resources. Moreover, production
activities have external effects for the current as well as future generations.
In order to discuss those issues, ideally, as Arrow et al (2012) argue, a broader
measure of societies’s wealth, including for example also human capital and
health, need to be developed. Since this is still at the beginning, we here have
restricted ourself to a more restricted measure of wealth and discuss the mod-
elling of extraction of resources starting from the basic model and then go on
to extensions including aspects of an open economy, backstop technology, and
climate change effects, constraints of carbon dioxide emissions and the change
of global temperature. Major macroeconomic problems of internal or exter-
nal type of resource-rich countries are discussed. These include the economic
impact of volatility and trend changes in world prices of the resources that
can cause fluctuations in export revenues, income and external imbalances.
We also review literature on resource depletion, peak production, “Dutch”
disease, and overborrowing and the threats from extensive external debt. We
further consider models and topics related to economic growth, abatement
of environmental damages, and the transition to renewable energy. We also
discuss decision making and policy options with multiple agents and more
complicated settings where there is strategic dependence between the deci-
sions of agents as is studied in game theoretical set ups. As shown strategic
decision making can give rise to complicated issues arising with respect to
resource extraction, environmental and mitigation policies and policy options
on the micro as well macro level.
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Appendix: numerical solution
Gru¨ne and Pannek (2011) introduced the NMPC which can be used for
solving the dynamic problems of the basic growth models and its variations
with exhaustible resources. Nonlinear system’s feedback control, which is
based on optimization, is described as a NMPC. As described in Gru¨ne and
Pannek (2011) and shown in Nyambuu and Semmler (2014), there is a pre-
dicted process, where at each time instant we choose a control input, un.
Future behavior of the state of the system with discrete time instants, xn, is
affected by the control inputs, un. The state of the system is tracked and con-
trol inputs are defined. It ensures to reduce the distance to a predetermined
reference, xrefn (Gru¨ne and Pannek, 2011). Then, a stabilization problem is
defined when the reference is zero38
Greiner et al. (2012a) point out that the procedure also works if the
steady state is not predicted. When the periods are very large the NMPC
provides a good approximation of the infinite time horizon solution. “Instead
of computing the optimal value function for all possible initial states, NMPC
only computes single (approximate) optimal trajectories” (Greiner et al.,
2012a, 16).
For the description the NMPC, we follow the sketch used in the Greiner
et al. (2012a, pp. 16-17). The optimal control problem can be described as
max
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtl(xt, ut)dt,
where xt satisfies x˙t = f(xt, ut), x(0) = x0. A discrete time problem with
the number of iteration, i, becomes:
max
∑∞
i=0β
il(xi, ui).
The optimization has a finite horizon N where xk+1,i = Φ(h, xk,i, uk,i) (see
Greiner et al., 2012a).
In solutions of the basic and extended growth models, a discounted variant
of the MATLAB routine nmpc.m39 with MATLAB’s fmincon NLP solver can
be used (see Greiner et al., 2012a). As N increases to infinity, the solution,
38See Gru¨ne and Pannek (2011)
39The MATLAB routine nmpc.m is available from www.nmpc− book.com
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(xi, ui), of the problem converges to the optimal solution. However, Gru¨ne
(2013) indicates that for the solution to converge to the optimal solution it
does not require to find the equilibrium values.
NMPC can be applied to economics, in particular for dynamic decision
problems. Gru¨ne et al. (2013) show that NMPC can efficiently and quite
accurately solve not only stochastic problems, but also models with “multiple
domains of attraction and thresholds” and “multiple equilibria and regime
switches in the dynamics.”40 They point out that, based on the solution
method41 of NMPC, “it is well suited to track the solution paths for infor-
mation constrained agents in the sense of Sims (2005, 2006).”42
They present one dimensional (1d) optimal control problems, including
basic growth models, basic DSGE models, as well as two dimensional (2d)43
models such as a 2d stochastic growth model, a 2d model with multiple
domains of attraction, and a 2d growth model with non-renewable resources.
In addition, three dimensional44 (3d) models of growth with non-renewable
resources and backstop technology and models with credit market frictions
are explored. These models are solved using NMPC algorithms and both
MATLAB and C++.
Gru¨ne et al. (2013) stress the advantages of NMPC in comparison to other
methods such as Dynamic Programming and show how state and control
variables can be computed. Numerical solution by NMPC does not require
the steady states and linearization (for details see Gru¨ne et al., 2013).
40Gru¨ne et al. (2013, p. 24).
41Gru¨ne et al. (2013) state that NMPC solves finite horizon dynamic decision problems
by approximating the corresponding infinite horizon models.
42Gru¨ne et al. (2013, p. 24).
43While 1d models have one state variable, 2d models have two state variables (Gru¨ne
et al., 2013)
44In Gru¨ne et al. (2013), 3d models have three state variables and two and three decision
variables.
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